



IS SUNLIGHT THE BEST DISINFECTANT? REASSESSING 
BEPS ACTION 5’S TAX RULING TRANSPARENCY 
PATRICK HASSON† 
The OECD's BEPS Project was a major attempt to harmonize tax principles 
across jurisdictions and prevent tax-motivated artificial profit shifting. One portion 
of the BEPS Project is Action 5's tax ruling transparency framework. High-profile 
instances of tax avoidance, such as LuxLeaks and the Apple/Ireland state aid case, 
have only elucidated the extent to which tax authorities can use rulings to facilitate 
tax avoidance. However, it should not be expected that Action 5's tax ruling 
transparency will materially curb the use of rulings to aid tax avoidance. 
For Action 5's transparency framework to achieve its goal, it must either deter 
countries from issuing favorable rulings that depart from the issuing country's tax 
laws and principles and other international tax norms or deter firms from utilizing 
these favorable rulings. This Comment argues that Action 5 does not have this 
deterrent effect. However, when tax ruling transparency is coupled with a 
disgorgement mechanism, such as in E.U. state aid law enforcement, transparency is 
likely to reduce the number of instances where tax rulings will serve as an effective 
tool to induce tax-motivated income shifting. As such, this Comment argues that a 
disgorgement mechanism, analogous to E.U. state aid law enforcement but with a 
different substantive backdrop, should be implemented to effectuate the desired 
behavioral responses of Action 5's tax ruling transparency framework. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For decades, the taxation of cross-border income generating activities has 
elicited significant attention from governments and policy experts.1 
 
1 When this Comment was in the editing process, some countries, including the United States, began 
expressing their support for the proposed OECD Pillar 2 seeking to implement a “global minimum tax.” 
See Daniel Bunn, Designing a Global Minimum Tax with Full Expensing, TAX FOUND. (Sept. 23, 2020), 
https://taxfoundation.org/designing-a-global-minimum-tax-with-full-expensing [https://perma.cc/DZP6-
YG8B] (providing a brief summary of the global minimum tax proposal); Jeff Stein, Yellen Pushes Global 
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Academics2 and policymakers3 have long been concerned about multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) exploiting differences in countries’ tax laws to pay as 
 
Minimum Tax as White House Eyes New Spending Plan, WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 2021, 11:55 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2021/03/15/yellen-pushes-global-minimum-tax-white-house-
eyes-new-spending-plan [https://perma.cc/C2TY-QTED] (explaining the Biden administration’s interest 
in a global minimum tax); Jan Strupczewski, EU Backs U.S. Call for Global Minimum Corporate Tax, but Rate 
to Be Decided, REUTERS (APR. 6, 2021, 10:46 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-treasury-yellen-
eu/eu-backs-u-s-call-for-global-minimum-corporate-tax-but-rate-to-be-decided-idUSKBN2BT1YG 
[https://perma.cc/GK6N-J8GX] (suggesting some E.U. support for the global minimum tax); Alan 
Rappeport, Finance Ministers Meet in Venice to Finalize Global Tax Agreement, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/09/business/g20-global-minimum-tax.html [https://perma.cc/SY54-
JTDX] (explaining that 131 countries favor a global minimum tax framework). This Comment focuses on 
the narrower issue of the effectiveness of the OECD BEPS Project’s Action 5 tax ruling transparency at 
preventing artificial income shifting. It argues that transparency alone will not deter the use of tax rulings 
to induce income shifting because, in part, existing measures to tax MNE’s artificially shifted income are 
ineffective. See infra notes 187–92 and accompanying text. The global minimum tax is certainly relevant to 
this Comment’s analysis because theoretically it would impose a layer of tax on income shifted due to a 
ruling and thus make this shifting less desirable. Nevertheless, this Comment’s analysis and proposal 
remain relevant notwithstanding the global minimum tax proposal for two reasons. 
First, dissenters from the global minimum tax may interfere with the efficacy of the proposal. 
See Rappeport, supra (explaining that some low-tax jurisdictions, such as Ireland, have not agreed to 
the proposal and providing a U.S. lawmaker’s remarks that the proposal “would be dead on arrival in 
Congress”). Second, even if a global minimum tax is widely adopted, the issues analyzed in this 
Comment would still be prevalent. As this Comment discusses, tax rulings have been used and are 
likely to still be used to induce MNEs to artificially shift income to countries that issue the rulings 
to provide the MNEs a low effective tax rate. See infra subsection I.A.2. The global minimum tax 
would simply set a floor as to this effective tax rate. However, with some countries seeking to raise 
their corporate tax rates, the differential between the corporate rate and the global minimum tax rate 
could be large. Compare Johanna Hey, GloBE: Do We Need a Super-CFC?, KLUWER INT’L TAX BLOG 
(Nov. 4, 2020), http://kluwertaxblog.com/2020/11/04/globe-do-we-need-a-super-cfc-forthcoming-
intertax-vol-49-2021-issue-1 [https://perma.cc/UC8F-NC8C] (suggesting that the global minimum 
tax rate would be between 10% and 15%), with Garrett Watson, Huaqun Li & Taylor LaJoie; Details 
and Analysis of President Joe Biden’s Tax Plan, TAX FOUND. (Oct. 22, 2020), 
https://taxfoundation.org/joe-biden-tax-plan-2020 [https://perma.cc/SWN3-CCVZ] (explaining 
President Biden’s goal of raising the U.S. corporate tax rate from 21% to 28%). And this differential 
would incentivize countries to shift income to low-tax jurisdictions to pay the global minimum tax 
rather than a higher rate of tax. Accordingly, as long as countries can use tax rulings to induce income 
shifting, as this Comment suggests, this Comment’s proposal would remain useful to counter ruling-
induced income shifting. 
2 See, e.g., Carol A. Brittain, Tax Evasion Through International Manipulation of Foreign Exchange 
Profits, 6 HASTINGS INT’L & COMPAR. L. REV. 719, 719-20 (1983) (detailing the manipulation of 
funds by foreign banks to evade U.S. taxes); Tracy A. Kaye, The Offshore Shell Game: U.S. Corporate 
Tax Avoidance Through Profit Shifting, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 185, 186 (2014) (analyzing multinational tax 
avoidance through manipulating intellectual property rights, debt, and transfer pricing); Edward D. 
Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 700, 701-02 (2011) (explaining the ability of 
multinational enterprises to generate income through foreign operations while avoiding taxation by 
the countries where the income is derived). 
3 See, e.g., JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R40623, TAX HAVENS: INTERNATIONAL 
TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION 2 (2015) (noting several attempts by Congress to stem corporate tax 
avoidance accomplished through international income shifting); Matti Ylönen, Back from Oblivion? The 
Rise and Fall of the Early Initiatives Against Tax Avoidance from the 1960s and 1980s, 23 TRANSNAT’L CORPS., 
no. 3, 2016, at 33, 38 (discussing OECD efforts in 1956 to address international tax avoidance); Amy 
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little tax on income as possible. Corporate inversions4 and other transactions 
with names such as the “Double Irish With a Dutch Sandwich”5 have only 
illuminated the ease by which MNEs can shift income and either defer or 
completely eliminate tax liability. Countries trying to prevent this tax-
motivated income shifting often seem to be playing a fruitless game of 
“whack-a-mole” as new tax avoidance strategies replace the old.6 
While in many instances countries may feel slighted by taxpayers’ efforts 
to avoid taxation, in other instances countries intentionally facilitate 
opportunities for MNEs to reduce their tax liabilities.7 Because decreasing an 
MNE’s tax liability is equivalent to providing a direct cash subsidy, countries 
have intentionally adopted favorable tax regimes to induce firms to shift 
income to those countries. Countries that successfully facilitate income 
shifting raise a sliver of tax revenue on this income they could not otherwise 
obtain absent such shifting. Much of this tax competition, however, involves 
only artificial income shifting rather than an increase in economic activity. 
And countries sometimes induce this income shifting by select taxpayers 
using a seemingly mundane aspect of tax administration: tax rulings. Tax 
rulings8 are a tax administration’s stance on the proper application of tax laws 
to a particular transaction. To obtain a ruling, the taxpayer typically submits 
a ruling request to the tax administration explaining the general structure of 
 
Dunbar, Ted Black, Andrew Duxbury & Thomas Schultz, Income-Shifting by U.S. Multinational Corporations 
in PAPERS GIVEN AT THE 7TH ANNUAL JOINT RESEARCH CONFERENCE ON TAX ADMINISTRATION 
4, 4 (Alan Plumley ed., 2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/17rescondunbar.pdf [https://perma.cc/XP4V-
P5WQ] (analyzing income shifting allowed by federal tax laws). 
4 A corporate inversion involves a corporation merging with and into another corporation that 
has residence in a different tax jurisdiction. CONG. BUDGET OFF., AN ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE 
INVERSIONS 1 (2017), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/115th-congress-2017-2018/reports/53093-
inversions.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7FS-KNP9]. Inversions alter the way in which a corporation is 
taxed. Whereas multinational corporations with a U.S. parent corporation are taxed by the U.S. on 
both domestic and foreign income, multinational corporations with a foreign parent only pay tax on 
income earned in the U.S. Id. 
5 Charles Duhigg & David Kocieniewski, How Apple Sidesteps Billions in Taxes, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 28, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/business/apples-tax-strategy-aims-at-low-tax-
states-and-nations.html [https://perma.cc/YGN4-PTVV]. 
6 See Paul Caron, Companies Save Billions in Taxes by Shifting Assets Around Globe, WALL ST. J. 
(Apr. 8, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/companies-save-billions-in-taxes-by-
shifting-assets-around-globe-11586347201 [https://perma.cc/Q4TM-53A2] (noting that despite 
attempts of countries to “tighten the tax net,” MNEs are avoiding income tax by shifting intangible 
assets to foreign subsidiaries). 
7 See ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV. [OECD], HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN 
EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE ¶ 4 (1998), https://www.oecd.org/ctp/harmful/1904176.pdf [https://
perma.cc/K4NJ-PZVQ] [hereinafter OECD, 1998 REPORT] (“[T]ax havens and harmful preferential tax 
regimes . . . affect the location of financial and other service activities, erode the tax bases of other 
countries, distort trade and investment patterns and undermine the fairness, neutrality and broad social 
acceptance of tax systems generally.”). 
8 For the purposes of this Comment, the use of the general term “tax rulings” also includes 
advanced pricing agreements (APAs). For a description of APAs, see infra note 38. 
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the transaction at issue and how it thinks the relevant tax laws apply. The tax 
administration, such as the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), then responds 
with a ruling. Rulings may be adverse to taxpayers9 or beneficial to them.10 
And rulings can go beyond merely clarifying the proper application of tax 
laws to a particular transaction by serving as a means to also effectively 
impose a taxpayer-favored tax liability, often significantly departing from the 
substance of the applicable tax laws. 
LuxLeaks and the Apple/Ireland state aid controversy have only further 
highlighted countries’ use of tax rulings to induce income shifting. LuxLeaks 
involved a 2014 report by the International Consortium of Investigative 
Journalists detailing Luxembourg’s habitual practice of issuing incredibly 
taxpayer-favored rulings intended to remain confidential.11 The report details 
the complex financial structures involving Luxembourg subsidiaries that, by 
virtue of the tax rulings granted, reduced MNEs’ effective tax rates below 
one percent.12 Similarly, the Apple/Ireland state aid case showed that Apple 
avoided roughly €13 billion in taxes by attributing the majority of its 
international sales to Irish subsidiaries then, by virtue of an Irish tax ruling, 
allocating most of the profits to different Apple subsidiaries that were not 
subject to any tax.13 
In response to widespread artificial income shifting, such as that involved 
in LuxLeaks and the Apple/Ireland case, the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) launched its Base Erosion and 
 
9 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 77-226, 1977-2 C.B. 90 (treating a share buyback and subsequent sale of the 
remaining shares to third parties as a single redemption to disallow a dividends received deduction 
and a short-term capital loss). 
10 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 74-565, 1974-2 C.B. 125 (disregarding a transitory subsidiary in a failed 
§ 368(a)(2)(E) reorganization to allow for a tax-free reorganization under § 368(a)(1)(B) although 
the form of the transaction does not technically comply with the latter provision). 
11 See generally Luxembourg Leaks: Global Companies’ Secrets Exposed, INT’L CONSORTIUM 
OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS, https://www.icij.org/investigations/luxembourg-leaks 
[https://perma.cc/44PH-7UBR]. 
12 Id. 
13 See Commission Decision 2017/1283 of 30 Aug. 2016 on State Aid SA.38373 (2014/C) (ex 
2014/NN) (ex 2014/CP) Implemented by Ireland to Apple, 2017 O.J. (L 187) 1; see also Press Release, 
Eur. Comm’n, State Aid: Ireland Gave Illegal Tax Benefits to Apple Worth Up to €13 Billion, (Aug. 30, 2016), 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/document/print/en/ip_16_2923/IP_16_2923_EN.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3BCR-MTKD]. Although the European Commission found that the rulings 
constituted state aid, Apple and Ireland ultimately won the dispute on appeal. See Case T-892/16, Apple 
Sales Int’l v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:T:2020:338 (July 15, 2020); Ryan Finley, EU Court Rules Against 
European Commission in Apple State Aid Case, 99 TAX NOTES INT’L 301, 301 (2020) (“The General 
Court’s decision . . . invalidates the commission’s largest state aid recovery order . . . .”). The 
Commission has announced that it will appeal the GCEU’s decision. See Commission Statement 
STATEMENT/20/1746, Statement by Executive Vice-President Margrethe Vestager on the 
Commission’s Decision to Appeal the General Court’s Judgment on the Apple Tax State Aid Case in 
Ireland (Sept. 25, 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_20_1746 
[https://perma.cc/6BU6-AS6V]. 
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Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project. BEPS refers generally to tax avoidance 
strategies whereby taxpayers shift income to tax favored locations without an 
associated shift of economic activity, which the OECD estimates deplete 
countries’ tax revenues by $100-240 billion annually.14 The OECD/G20 BEPS 
Project,15 through its myriad policy tools called “Actions,” attempts to combat 
this type of tax avoidance by harmonizing tax principles across countries and 
creating minimum standards to which participating countries must adhere.16 
While the OECD BEPS Project focuses on ending many tax avoidance 
strategies, Action 5 specifically addresses the issue of tax rulings by requiring 
all participating countries to exchange, or share, those rulings with countries 
whose tax bases may be affected by the tax rulings issued.17 
The OECD18 and other commentators have argued that the OECD 
BEPS Project’s tax ruling transparency can adequately prevent countries 
from using rulings to grant unwarranted tax concessions.19 But others have 
questioned the ability of transparency to have any effect given that there are 
no repercussions for countries that deviate from Action 5’s tax ruling 
transparency minimum standards.20 These latter commentators’ conclusions 
 
14 What Is BEPS?, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/about [https://perma.cc/398Y-JCNT]. 
15 BEPS Actions, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/beps-actions [https://perma.cc/L32X-7AEN]. 
16 Id. 
17 See generally OECD, COUNTERING HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES MORE EFFECTIVELY, 
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT TRANSPARENCY AND SUBSTANCE: ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT 
(2015) [hereinafter OECD, ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT]. 
18 See OECD, OECD/G20 INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK ON BEPS: PROGRESS REPORT JULY 
2019–JULY 2020, at 16 (2020) [hereinafter OECD, 2019–2020 PROGRESS REPORT] (“[T]ransparency 
continues to deter tax administrations and taxpayers from engaging in rulings practices that may 
give rise to BEPS concerns.”); OECD, OECD/G20 INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK ON BEPS: 
PROGRESS REPORT JULY 2018–MAY 2019, at 9 (2019) [hereinafter OECD, 2018–2019 PROGRESS 
REPORT] (noting that tax ruling transparency should eliminate the prevalence of “‘sweetheart 
deals’” between MNEs and countries). 
19 See, e.g., Thomas Neubig, Global Tax Administration Initiatives Addressing Tax Evasion and 
Avoidance, 91 TAX NOTES INT’L 1137, 1140 (2018) (“[T]ransparency . . . will discourage the most 
egregious tax planning activity of MNEs . . . .”); Mindy Herzfeld, News Analysis, Luxembourg Plans 
for a Post-BEPS World, 81 TAX NOTES INT’L 908, 908 (2016) (“[T]he automatic exchange of rulings 
adversely impacts jurisdictions where taxpayers depended heavily on rulings to confirm tax 
positions.”); Stuart Gibson, EU State Aid; More Cracks in the Wall of Secrecy, 80 TAX NOTES INT’L 
473, 473 (2015) (“Combined with the final report on action 5 of the OECD’s BEPS [P]roject . . .  the 
world seems to have built a solid foundation not only to combat base erosion and profit shifting, but 
also to give all tax administrations the tools to detect such abuse.”). 
20 See, e.g., Allison Christians, BEPS and the New International Tax Order, 2016 BYU L. REV. 
1603, 1632 (noting that there is no imposition of penalties or prohibitions for issuing preferential tax 
treatment through tax rulings); Itai Grinberg, The New International Tax Diplomacy, 104 GEO. L.J. 
1137, 1166 (2016) (considering tax ruling transparency and noting that “[c]oordinated implementation 
of any kind or substantial improvements in cross-border administrative assistance . . . will prove 
challenging in the absence of any enforcement mechanism”); Carlo Biz, Countering Tax Avoidance at 
the EU Level After “LuxLeaks”: A History of Tax Rulings, Transparency and BEPS: Base Erosion Profit 
Shifting or Bending European Perspective Solutions?, 7 DIRITTO E PRACTICA TRIBUTARIA 
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are correct.21 The OECD BEPS Project’s tax ruling transparency alone will 
not change firm or country behavior because exposing tax avoidance does not 
reduce its net benefits to either countries or firms. And participating 
countries do not seem to heed the OECD’s 2018 recommendation to impose 
sanctions on firms that improperly utilize “preferential regimes.”22 In fact, the 
2018 recommendation is so fundamentally flawed that it does not warrant any 
serious consideration with respect to Action 5’s behavioral implications.23 
Accordingly, Action 5’s tax ruling transparency will not produce the results 
envisioned by the OECD; namely, countries’ use of tax rulings to induce 
income shifting. 
However, tax ruling transparency may deter some tax-motivated income 
shifting in the context of European Union’s state aid law.24 State aid law 
generally bars the use of state resources to provide a competitive advantage 
 
INTERNAZIONALE 1035, 1067 (“[T]ransparency is obviously not the longed for deus ex machina, 
which can solve the extensive range of problems of the complex and hazy web that international tax 
law is.”); Arkadiusz Myszkowski, Special Report, An Evaluation of BEPS Action 5, 81 TAX NOTES 
INT’L 365, 371 (2016) (noting in regard to Action 5that “one can take only a pessimistic view when 
non-exchange of rulings by tax authorities is not subject to any penalties at all”); see also id. (“[O]ne 
can question whether tax authorities and MNEs will collude to avoid exchanging rulings.”). 
Additional concerns outside the scope of this Comment also exist. See, e.g., id. at 369-70 (arguing 
that the efficacy of Action 5 depends on compliance by non-OECD member countries and noting 
the difficulty the limited extent of such countries’ compliance with early OECD work on tax competition). 
21 Their position is further substantiated by the OECD’s report in the summer of 2020 
providing some empirical evidence that the BEPS Project as a whole has not had the intended effect 
of mitigating profit shifting. See generally OECD, CORPORATE TAX STATISTICS 44 (2d ed. 2020) 
(observing that OECD data suggests the existence of “BEPS channels” and the possibility of “a 
misalignment between the location where profits are reported and the location where economic 
activities occur”); see also Ryan Finley, Country Digest, OECD’s CbC Reporting Data Show Ongoing 
Profit Shifting, 99 TAX NOTES INT’L 268, 268 (2020) (“Aggregated data collected by the 
OECD . . . suggest that the [OECD BEPS Project] hasn’t yet achieved its goal of aligning profit 
with value creation.”); New Corporate Tax Statistics Provide Fresh Insights into the Activities of 
Multinational Enterprises, OECD (Aug. 7, 2020), https://www.oecd.org/tax/new-corporate-tax-
statistics-provide-fresh-insights-into-the-activities-of-multinational-enterprises.htm 
[https://perma.cc/9CM5-UNKZ] [hereinafter Fresh Insights] (noting that the compiled statistics are 
“indicative of the existence of BEPS behaviour”). 
22 For a discussion on preferential regimes, see infra notes 102–06 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra note 151. 
24 See, e.g., Saturnina Moreno González, State Aid and Tax Competition: Comments on the 
European Commission’s Decisions on Transfer Pricing Rulings, 2016 EUR. STATE AID L.Q. 556, 574 
(2016) (“[T]he opening of investigations into the tax ruling practices of the Member States as State 
aid has served to bolster the BEPS Project in the European Union.”); see also Kevin Markle & Leslie 
Robinson, Negotiated Tax Havens 11, 37 fig.1 (Tuck Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 3280683, 2021), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3280683 (observing that in 2016 the 
Commission began compiling aid expenditure data at the beneficiary level and graphically 
demonstrating that the level of tax-related aid decreased relative to the total amount of aid granted 
by Member States). 
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to firms operating in E.U. Member States,25 and requires Member States to 
recover such resources that violate this standard, referred to as unlawful aid. 
State aid not only contemplates direct government outlays, but also the 
reduction of firm tax liabilities through tax rulings.26 As such, any tax 
concession that a Member State issues through a tax ruling is potentially 
subject to disgorgement through the enforcement of state aid law.27 
The OECD BEPS Project’s tax ruling transparency increases the 
likelihood that the Member State who issued the ruling must recover, and 
consequently the recipient MNE must surrender, the tax concession afforded. 
Increased transparency enables the European Commission—the body 
responsible for enforcing state aid law—to more productively identify 
unlawful state aid. This directly reduces the expected value of the tax 
concession to the recipient MNE. Consequently, rulings become less 
effective at inducing tax-motivated income shifting, which can change 
country and MNE behavior of issuing and accepting, respectively, tax 
concessions afforded by tax rulings. The possibility that an MNE may have 
to surrender the tax concession in the European Union is the sole reason to 
expect any behavioral changes following the implementation of Action 5’s tax 
ruling transparency. Action 5’s behavioral impact can only stem E.U. 
countries’ use of tax rulings to induce income shifting, however, because there 
is no comparable disgorgement or penalty mechanism for countries outside 
the European Union. 
But even in the E.U. state aid context, tax ruling transparency will only 
prove moderately effective. State aid law, from a theoretical perspective, is 
not well equipped to handle BEPS issues, and some state aid decisions 
concerning tax rulings, such as the recent decision involving Apple,28 
highlight some of its limitations. Merely extending state aid law to non-E.U. 
countries, while perhaps theoretically tempting because of its existing 
disgorgement mechanism, will not stem the use of tax rulings to facilitate tax 
 
25 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 107, 
Sept. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 87 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
26 Commission Notice on the Notion of State Aid as Referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union, 2016 O.J. 1, 36-37 [hereinafter Commission Notice on State Aid]. 
27 See Ruth Mason, Special Report, Tax Rulings as State Aid FAQ, 154 TAX NOTES 451, 452 (2017) 
(positing that tax subsidies, necessarily including those granted through tax rulings, “easily satisfy” some 
elements of illegal state aid and thus require the Commission to demonstrate the elements of advantage 
and selectivity); EUR. COMM’N,  COMPETITION: STATE AID PROCEDURES (2013), 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/factsheets/state_aid_procedures_en.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6L9M-7FPY] (explaining that when the European Commission takes a negative decision with 
respect to aid already paid out, the Member State must recover the aid with interest from the beneficiary). 
28 See Case T-892/16, Apple Sales Int’l v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:T:2020:338, ¶ 505 (July 15, 2020) 
(“[I]t must be concluded that the Commission did not succeed in showing, in the present instance, 
that, by issuing the contested tax rulings, the Irish tax authorities had granted ASI and AOE [two 
Apple subsidiaries] a selective advantage for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU.”). 
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avoidance. The state aid cases that involve tax rulings and require 
disgorgement of the afforded tax concession rest on flawed applications of 
state aid law, as they implicitly disregard the fact that the tax ruling is the sole 
reason the income shifting necessarily at issue occurred.29 As such, a BEPS-
focused disgorgement mechanism,30 procedurally analogous to state aid law 
enforcement but with a substantive foundation consisting of the OECD BEPS 
Project Actions, other OECD guidelines, and the issuing country’s tax laws 
is the best means for the OECD and countries participating in the OECD 
BEPS Project adversely affected by tax ruling-induced income shifting to 
significantly combat the use of tax rulings as a tax avoidance tool. 
Although some commentators acknowledge that countries are not 
incentivized to adhere to the OECD BEPS Project Actions, including Action 
5, no work has addressed the shortcomings of tax ruling transparency using 
formal economic methods. More importantly, theoretical economic 
considerations are also absent in work mentioning the efficacy of transparency 
in the E.U. state aid context.31 As such, this Comment addresses this shortfall 
in the literature on tax rulings by providing a theoretical analysis of the 
behavioral implications of incorporating solely a transparency framework and 
of incorporating a transparency framework coupled with the possibility of 
surrendering undue tax concessions. As a result of the theoretical conclusions, 
this Comment proposes that the OECD form a BEPS-focused disgorgement 
mechanism analogous to E.U. state aid law to accompany Action 5’s 
transparency framework because tax ruling transparency will only trigger 
behavioral responses when there is a possibility that the tax concession 
afforded through the ruling may be subject to disgorgement. 
This Comment is structured as follows. Part I provides a general overview 
of tax rulings, their use to facilitate BEPS strategies, and the OECD’s work 
to combat such uses of tax rulings. Part II then provides a theoretical analysis 
of expected behavioral consequences from the introduction of Action 5’s 
transparency framework in both the presence and absence of an existing 
 
29 See infra notes 273–80 and accompanying text. An acknowledgement in these cases that the 
tax ruling was the necessary condition to induce the income shifting at issue would lead to the 
conclusion that the relevant Member State did not use state resources to provide a competitive 
advantage to the firm receiving the challenged tax concession. See Adrien Giraud & Sylvain Petit, 
Tax Rulings and State Aid Qualification: Should Reality Matter?, 2017 EUR. STATE AID L.Q. 233, 234 
(2017) (observing that MNEs “enjoy a great deal of discretion” as to where they shift income and 
positing that, in the case of Ireland and Apple, “Ireland’s tax authorities negotiated Apple’s taxable 
basis precisely because Apple had the possibility of shifting the corresponding revenues elsewhere 
if a satisfying compromise was not found”); infra notes 278–80 and accompanying text. 
30 All references to a “BEPS-focused disgorgement mechanism” mean a disgorgement 
mechanism structured to address general BEPS issues. For a detailed description of the proposed 
BEPS-focused disgorgement mechanism, see infra Section III.B. 
31 See Neubig, supra note 19, at 1148 (“No studies have been done on the effect of transparency 
on government rulings, which is addressed in the harmful tax practice BEPS Action 5.”). 
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disgorgement mechanism. This Part concludes that desired behavioral 
responses to tax ruling transparency occur only when tax concessions afforded 
through rulings are potentially subject to disgorgement. Part III proposes a 
disgorgement mechanism in the context of the OECD BEPS Project. This 
Part analyzes the substantive and procedural aspects of E.U. state aid law and 
then argues that state aid law is inadequate to handle general BEPS issues. It 
concludes by outlining a general structure of a BEPS-focused disgorgement 
mechanism, with OECD BEPS Project Action items, other OECD work on 
tax matters, and the issuing country’s tax laws serving as the substantive backdrop. 
I. TAX RULINGS, TAX COMPETITION, AND THE OECD BEPS 
PROJECT 
Countries use tax rulings to effectively administer tax laws, and sometimes 
to compete for foreign investment. The OECD recognized in the 1980s that 
tax competition can distort economic decisions and lead to harmful tax 
consequences.32 More recently, the OECD recognized the role of tax rulings 
in effectuating harmful tax competition. As a result, the OECD formally 
addressed tax rulings as a tool for tax avoidance in the OECD BEPS Project. 
A. An Overview of Tax Rulings and Their Potentially “Harmful” Uses 
Tax rulings are commonplace in modern tax systems. They provide 
guidance on the applicable tax treatment for many, though not all,33 types of 
transactions. However, taxpayers and tax administrations also use tax rulings 
to provide favorable tax treatment to specific taxpayers. Some of these 
favorable rulings induce taxpayers to artificially shift income, which does not 
require a shift in economic activity but does deplete the tax bases of other countries. 
1. Tax Rulings: Their Purpose and Uses 
Tax rulings are pronouncements by tax authorities to taxpayers that 
provide guidance on how a given transaction or structure will be taxed.34 
 
32 Andrew P. Morriss & Lotta Moberg, Cartelizing Taxes: Understanding the OECD’s Campaign 
Against “Harmful Tax Competition,” 4 COLUM. J. TAX L. 1, 33 (2012). 
33 See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2020-1, 2020-1 I.R.B. 18-23 (listing types of transactions where the IRS 
will not issue a tax ruling). 
34 See OECD, ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, ¶ 95 (“Rulings are ‘any advice, 
information or undertaking provided by a tax authority to a specific taxpayer or group of taxpayers 
concerning their tax situation and on which they are entitled to rely.’”) (quoting OECD, 
CONSOLIDATED APPLICATION NOTE: GUIDANCE IN APPLYING THE 1998 REPORT TO 
PREFERENTIAL TAX REGIMES ¶ 161 (2004)); see also ELLY VAN DE VELDE, ‘TAX RULINGS’ IN 
THE EU MEMBER STATES 6 (2015); Lilian V. Faulhaber, The Trouble with Tax Competition: From 
Practice to Theory, 71 TAX L. REV. 311, 333 (2018). 
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Generally, tax rulings fall into two broad classifications. The first type is 
taxpayer-specific rulings. These rulings apply to a specific taxpayer and 
typically entitle that taxpayer to rely on the ruling.35 Tax authorities can issue 
these rulings either before or after a transaction.36 Pre-transaction rulings are 
more common than post-transaction rulings37 and can further be characterized 
as advance tax rulings and advanced pricing agreements (APAs).38 In addition 
to taxpayer-specific rulings, the second broad classification is a general ruling. 
Rather than applying to a specific taxpayer, general rulings apply to groups or 
types of taxpayers or to a defined set of circumstances.39 
Tax rulings are crucial to effectively administer tax laws. Because tax laws 
and regulations are complex and sometimes vague, the taxpayer’s judgment 
may be inadequate to predict the tax consequences of a contemplated 
structure or transaction.40 Rulings provide administrative efficiency by 
solidifying the tax consequences of transactions or structures.41 This reduces 
the likelihood of future conflict or litigation between tax authorities and 
taxpayers.42 For instance, private letter rulings43 bind the relevant tax 
 
35 OECD, ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, ¶ 97. 
36 Id. 
37 See id. ¶ 98 (“Typically, the taxpayer concerned will make an application for a ruling before 
undertaking the transaction concerned . . . .”). 
38 APAs are arrangements that determine “in advance of controlled transactions, an 
appropriate set of criteria . . . for the determination of the transfer pricing for those transactions 
over a fixed period of time.” Id. ¶ 99 (quoting OECD, OECD TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES 
FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND TAX ADMINISTRATORS § 4.123 (2010)). These rulings 
are more stringent than ordinary advance tax rulings in that determinations typically require 
verification of the factual assumptions on which the legal determinations are based. Id. ¶ 100. 
39 Id. ¶ 102; see, e.g., supra notes 9–10. 
40 VAN DE VELDE, supra note 34, § 1.1.2. 
41 Id.; see also Biz, supra note 20, at 1038; Pierpaolo Rossi-Maccanico, Special Report, Fiscal Aid, 
Tax Competition, and BEPS, 75 TAX NOTES INT’L 857, 866 (2014) (“A unilateral APA . . . gives the 
taxpayer’s group legal certainty of the taxation of intragroup transactions . . . .”); Yehonatan Givati, 
Resolving Legal Uncertainty: The Unfulfilled Promise of Advance Tax Rulings 29 VA. TAX REV. 137, 147 
(2009) (“The advance ruling process is understood to be important for many reasons, but especially 
because taxpayers can achieve legal certainty regarding the tax consequences of contemplated 
transactions by using it.”). 
42 See INT’L MONETARY FUND & OECD, Tax Certainty: IMF/OECD Report for the G20 
Finance Ministers 37 (Mar. 2017) [hereinafter IMF/OECD REPORT] (noting that ruling regimes are 
within the set of tools identified to have the largest impact in avoiding tax disputes). 
43 In the U.S., private letter rulings are written statements issued by the IRS describing how the 
tax laws apply to the taxpayer’s specific facts. Understanding IRS Guidance – A Brief Primer, INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/understanding-irs-guidance-a-brief-primer [https://
perma.cc/XYG9-VGKU] (last updated Sept. 24, 2020). 
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authority in many jurisdictions,44 including the IRS in the United States.45 
Regardless of whether the ruling legally binds the tax authority, taxpayers can 
generally rely on rulings, so long as they structure their transaction in 
accordance with the facts in the ruling.46 As the number of tax disputes rises 
globally,47 many experts unsurprisingly view tax rulings as “an indispensable 
tool in the modern world of tax administration and compliance.”48 
While not intrinsically problematic, tax rulings may also facilitate 
“harmful” tax practices. Because rulings can be taxpayer-specific, they allow 
issuing countries to grant favorable tax treatment to individual taxpayers.49 
As a result, recipients of rulings that offer favorable tax treatment shift their 
income to those locations. But this income shifting is not associated with a 
comparable increase in economic activity.50 This produces a mismatch 
between where income is earned and where it is taxed. 
Such income shifts can also adversely impact other countries, whose 
taxable base is reduced as income is shifted into jurisdictions that issue 
favorable tax rulings.51 This tax base depletion can occur in any tax system. In 
 
44 See Cory Hillier & Christophe Waerzeggers, Introducing an Advance Tax Ruling (ATR) 
Regime, TAX L. IMF TECHN. NOTE, May 2016, at 1, 1 (noting that private tax rulings typically 
“bind[] the tax authority in relation to the arrangement for which it is issued”); see also IMF/OECD 
REPORT, supra note 42, at 53 (“[A] private ruling is usually binding only for a particular transaction.”). 
45 See Understanding IRS Guidance, supra note 43 (“A [private letter ruling] is binding on the 
IRS if the taxpayer fully and accurately described the proposed transaction in the request and carries 
out the transaction as described.”) 
46 OECD, ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, ¶ 98. 
47 See Global Tax Disputes Update, KPMG (July 2019), https://home.kpmg/xx/en/home/
insights/2019/07/global-tax-disputes-update-july-2019.html [https://perma.cc/KED9-PCME] (“[T]ax audit 
and dispute activity [is] rising in almost every country . . . .”). 
48 Biz, supra note 20, at 1038 (quoting Maarten J. Ellis, General Report, 84b CAHIERS DE DROIT 
FISCAL INTERNATIONAL 21, 24 (1999)). 
49 See Grinberg, supra note 20, at 1164 (noting that the purpose of the OECD BEPS Project 
Action 5’s spontaneous exchange of tax rulings is to “cabin special tax deals” between foreign MNEs 
and countries); Nina Hrushko, Note, Tax in the World of Antitrust Enforcement: European Commission’s 
State Aid Investigations into EU Member States’ Tax Rulings, 43 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 327, 338 (2017) 
(explaining that tax rulings can constitute illegal state aid, which necessarily requires a selective advantage). 
50 Jeffrey Owens, The David H. Tillinghast Lecture—Tax Competition: To Welcome or Not, 65 TAX 
L. REV. 173, 180 (2012) (distinguishing between investment and taxable profits and explaining 
methods to reduce taxable income in jurisdictions where the income is earned); see also OECD, 1998 
REPORT, supra note 7, at 30 (noting that the “[i]nappropriate use of advanced rulings 
and . . . individual negotiated agreements can . . . distort the competitive position of countries”). 
51 See supra note 7; see also Samuel Johnston, Multilateral Tax Convention to Prevent Base Erosion 
and Profit Shifting, 23 AUCKLAND U. L. REV. 384, 384 (2017) (“This issue is referred to as base 
erosion and profit shifting (BEPS)—the tax bases of high tax jurisdictions are eroded and profits 
are shifted to low or no tax jurisdictions.”); Kerrie Sadiq, Adrian Sawyer & Bronwyn McCredie, 
Jurisdictional Responses to Base Erosion and Profit Shifting: A Study of 19 Key Domestic Tax Systems, 16 
EJOURNAL TAX RSCH. 737, 752 (2019) (noting that resident entities can “strip the tax base” of their 
resident country by holding an interest in a foreign firm). 
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“worldwide” tax systems, residents are taxed on their global earnings.52 
Residence country tax bases decrease because MNEs can operate through 
foreign entities to both utilize favorable rulings and defer immediate 
residence-country taxation by avoiding provisions that attribute foreign 
subsidiary earnings to the resident MNE. In systems more akin to 
“territorial” tax systems that generally exempt foreign source income from 
tax,53 residence-country tax base depletion occurs because MNEs can operate 
through foreign entities that derive income that is generally exempt from 
residence-country tax while also avoiding the tax system’s provisions that are 
more akin to those in a worldwide system, with rulings incentivizing MNEs 
to shift income so that it is not sourced to the resident country. Therefore, 
the favorable tax treatment provided by rulings can induce income shifting to 
the detriment of other countries’ tax bases. 
While potentially harmful to residence countries’ tax bases, these income 
shifting strategies are desirable from an MNE’s perspective. Shifting income 
to a low-tax jurisdiction and avoiding residence country taxation effectively 
allows the MNE to achieve “double non-taxation,” or negligible tax liability 
that is due immediately to the residence country and to the country to which 
the MNE shifted its income.54 Although income shifting does not require tax 
rulings,55 tax rulings exacerbate the phenomenon by effectively allowing for 
individualized tax liabilities56 and creating opportunities for tax avoidance 
that were either nonexistent or not as attractive without a tax ruling. 
 
52 KYLE POMERLEAU, A HYBRID APPROACH: THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN PROFITS UNDER 
THE TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT 2 (2018), https://files.taxfoundation.org/20180502205047/Tax-Foundation-
FF586.pdf [https://perma.cc/QJ9Y-8HE9]. 
53 Id. at 3. A “pure” territorial system entirely exempts foreign source income from residence 
country tax. See id. at 2. Most OECD countries have hybrid systems with aspects of both worldwide 
and territorial systems. Id. 
54 OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 15 (2013) [hereinafter 
OECD, BEPS ACTION PLAN] (observing that the interaction of different countries’ tax rules can 
reduce or eliminate tax liability); see also Christian Kahlenberg, Prevention of Double Non-taxation: An 
Analysis of Cross-Border Financing from a German Perspective, 43 INTERTAX 218, 218 (2015) (recognizing 
MNEs’ tax planning strategies to shift income to “tax havens,” which leads to double non-taxation); 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (“BEPS”), PWC (Sept. 25, 2019), https://perma.cc/FY9W-VCEL 
(explaining that base erosion and profit schemes often lead to double non-taxation). 
55 See What Is BEPS?, supra note 14 (noting that income shifting can result from discrepancies 
between different countries’ tax laws). 
56 See Markle & Robinson, supra note 24, at 11 (“In several cases, the deals—known as ‘tax rulings’—
allowed firms to pay tax in Luxembourg at a rate of less than 1 percent.”); Commission Decision of 11 June 
2014, State Aid SA/38373 (2014/C)(ex 2014/NN)(ex 2014/CP)—Ireland Alleged Aid to Apple, ¶¶ 36-37, C(2014) 
3606 final, https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/253200/253200_1582634_87_2.pdf [https://
perma.cc/C3L4-X8S9] (providing an excerpt of a conversation between Irish tax authorities and Apple 
representatives explicitly referring to a negotiated taxable income figure). 
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2. Tax Rulings and Tax Competition: An Analysis of the Apple/Ireland 
State Aid Case 
The previous subsection detailed the general types of tax rulings and how 
they can be used to effectuate tax avoidance. The Apple/Ireland state aid case 
illustrates the operation of rulings, the types of transactions and structures 
involved, the means for MNEs to artificially shift income, and the ability of 
rulings to immediately reduce tax liability. 
Apple Inc. is a U.S.-based technology company that primarily sells 
consumer technology goods.57 Since 1980, Apple Inc. has organized its sales 
by allocating them between two separate regions. The U.S.-based Apple Inc. 
handles sales in the Americas while Apple Sales International coordinates 
Apple’s sales efforts in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, India, Asia, and the 
Pacific.58 Apple Sales International is an Irish-incorporated entity and a direct 
subsidiary of Apple Operations Europe.59 Apple Operations Europe is the 
Irish subsidiary of Apple Operations International, which is an Irish 
incorporated entity ultimately owned by Apple Inc.60 Apple Operations 
Europe is primarily responsible for manufacturing certain lines of Apple 
products.61 Although Apple Sales International and Apple Operations 
Europe are both Irish-incorporated entities ultimately owned by U.S.-based 
Apple Inc., they are both stateless for tax purposes as they are neither tax 
residents of Ireland or the U.S.62 Because countries generally only have the 
right to tax entities with tax residency in that country,63 neither Ireland nor 
the U.S. could tax Apple Sales International and Apple Operations Europe. 
 
57 See Memorandum from Sen. Carl Levin, Chairman, & Sen. John McCain, Ranking 
Minory Member, Permanent Subcomm. On Investigations, to Members of the Permanent 
Subcomm. On Investigations, Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code—Part 2 (Apple 
Inc.), at 17 (May 21, 2013), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/EXHIBIT%201a%20-
%20Subcommittee%20Memo%20on%20Offshore%20Profit%20Shifting%20&%20Apple%20(May%
2021%202013).pdf [https://perma.cc/T3VG-WW42] (“Apple is a personal computer and technology 
company specializing in the design and sale of computers, mobile telephones, and other high-
technology personal goods.”). 
58 Commission Decision 2017/1283, supra note 13, at 5-6 ¶¶ 40-46. 
59 Id. at ¶ 47 & fig.1. 
60 Id. 
61 Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, supra note 13, at 2. 
62 See Commission Decision 2017/1283, supra note 13, at 7 ¶ 52 (“During the time that the 
contested tax rulings were in force, ASI and AOE could therefore be best described as ‘stateless’ for 
tax residency purposes.”); see also Levin & McCain, supra note 57, at 23-24 (noting that these entities 
do not have any tax residency because they do not meet Ireland’s “management and control” test of 
residency or the “place of formation” residency requirement of the United States). 
63 A country can tax income of nonresidents if the source of the nonresident’s income is that 
country. For example, the United States taxes foreign entities on items of income if the source of 
that income is the U.S. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 861-65, 882, 884, 1442 (providing for U.S. taxation of foreign 
corporations for U.S. source items of income). 
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The E.U. state aid case initiated by the European Commission involved 
tax rulings that Ireland issued in 1991 and 2007 to both Apple Sales 
International and Apple Operations Europe.64 The rulings authorized both 
entities to internally allocate their income between themselves and their 
respective Irish branch offices.65 The 1991 ruling to Apple Operations 
Europe66 provided that the net profit attributable to its branch office would 
be the sum of 65% of Apple Operation Europe’s operating expenses up to 
$60-70 million and 20% of such expenses in excess of $60-70 million.67 The 
2007 ruling revised the profit determination for the branch office to be a 10-
15% margin on Apple Operation Europe’s operating costs, excluding certain 
costs, plus a fixed 1-5% return on its intellectual property.68 The 1991 ruling 
to Apple Sales International69 provided that net profit attributable to its 
branch office for tax purposes would be 12.5% of Apple Sales International’s 
operating costs, excluding certain costs.70 The 2007 ruling changed the 
percentage from 12.5% to 10-15%.71 Apple Operations Europe and Apple Sales 
International allocated their remaining earnings to their respective “head 
offices,” which were non-Irish residents for tax purposes.72 
The rulings that Ireland issued to Apple Sales International and Apple 
Operations Europe significantly decreased each entity’s respective tax 
liabilities. Each year in which the rulings applied, Ireland only taxed the 
profits allocated to the branch offices of Apple Sales International and Apple 
Operations Europe.73 However, the branch office profits were significantly 
less than profits allocated to the head offices. For example, in 2011 Apple Sales 
International recorded total profits of roughly €16 billion, but because of the 
ruling, Ireland taxed approximately €50 million.74 As a result, the effective tax 
rate on Apple Sales International’s profits was consistently below Ireland’s 
statutory tax rate of 12.5% and from 2011 to 2014, for example, ranged from 
0.05% in 2011 to 0.005% in 2014.75 
 
64 Commission Decision 2017/1283, supra note 13, at 5 ¶ 39. 
65 Id. 
66 At the time Apple Operations Europe was Apple Computer Ltd. Id. at 9 ¶ 61. 
67 Id. at 9-10 ¶ 61. 
68 Id. at 10 ¶ 62. 
69 At the time Apple Sales International was Apple Computer Accessories Ltd. Id. at 9 ¶ 59. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 9 ¶ 60. 
72 Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, supra note 13, at 1 (“These profits allocated to the ‘head offices’ 
were not subject to tax in any country under specific provisions of the Irish tax law, which are no 
longer in force.”). 
73 See Commission Decision of 11 June 2014, supra note 56, ¶¶ 21-24 (providing data on taxed 
profits from Apple Sales International’s and Apple Operations Europe’s branch offices). 
74 Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, supra note 13, at 2. 
75 See id. 
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But why would Apple want to decrease its Irish tax liability? The U.S.-
based Apple ultimately owns the Irish entities, and U.S. residents are subject 
to tax on their worldwide income.76 As a result, one may suspect that Apple 
would owe U.S. tax on the Irish earnings of its subsidiaries, less a credit for 
Irish taxes paid.77 And because the Irish tax liability was relatively small, the 
U.S. tax would be relatively large. However, as mentioned, U.S. based MNEs 
can avoid U.S. income tax liability on profits earned outside the U.S., which 
is precisely what Apple did. In effect, these rulings afforded Apple a relatively 
low current Irish tax liability while it deferred its U.S. tax liability by shifting 
income to its Irish subsidiaries. 
Because tax rulings set Apple’s Irish tax so low, Apple shifted its income 
to both utilize the favorable effective rate afforded by the rulings and to 
circumvent the Internal Revenue Code (Code).78 This income-shifting 
structure enabled Apple to defer U.S. income tax liability on its Irish 
subsidiaries’ earnings. A detailed explanation of this structure is helpful to 
fully appreciate the utility and mechanics of international income shifting for 
Apple, and U.S.-based MNEs in general, and tax rulings’ role in this shifting. 
Although U.S. residents are subject to U.S. income tax on their worldwide 
incomes, foreign subsidiaries are respected by the Code as entities that are 
separate from their U.S. parent companies. As such, foreign subsidiary 
income is generally not taxable until there is a “recognition event,”79 such as 
 
76 See I.R.C. § 61(a) (“[G]ross income means all income from whatever source derived . . . .”); 
Treas. Reg. § 1.1-1(b) (as amended in 2008) (“[A]ll citizens of the United States . . . are liable to the 
income taxes imposed by the Code whether the income is received from sources within or without 
the United States.”); see also Joseph B. Darby III & Kelsey Lemaster, Double Irish More than Doubles 
the Tax Savings, PRAC. US/INT’L TAX STRATEGIES, May 15, 2007, at 2, 2 (noting that domestic 
corporations are subject to U.S. income tax on their worldwide income). 
77 See I.R.C. § 901(a), (b)(1) (providing a credit for income taxes paid to a foreign country 
during the taxable year); see also Tax Convention, Ir.-U.S., art. 29(2)(a), July 28, 1997, S. TREATY 
DOC. No. 105-31 (1997) (“This Convention shall enter into force . . . in respect of taxes withheld at 
source, for amounts paid or credited . . . .”). 
78 The following description of Apple’s tax avoidance involving the Irish tax rulings occurred 
before the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), when the Code was more akin to a worldwide system of 
taxation. Apple’s strategy was to avoid tax imposed under Subpart F of the Code, which it 
successfully did utilizing the “check-the-box” regulations. See infra notes 82–95 and accompanying 
text. However, even with the Code’s shift towards a more territorial system, the TCJA did not 
materially alter either Subpart F or the check-the-box regulations, although the § 245A deduction 
for the foreign portion of foreign corporation dividends reduced the importance of the check-the-
box regulations as they pertain to the passive income portion of Subpart F, including items of income 
used to compute § 954(a)(1) foreign personal holding company income. J. Clifton Fleming Jr., 
Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Expanded Worldwide Versus Territorial Taxation After the TCJA, 
161 TAX NOTES 1173, 1179, 1181 (2018). As a result, the TCJA may not have completely undermined 
the efficacy of Apple’s tax avoidance strategy. 
79 Darby & Lemaster, supra note 76, at 14. 
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sales or exchanges of assets.80 In the context of cross-border organizational 
structures and transactions, recognition events are typically dividend 
distributions from a non-U.S. subsidiary to the U.S. parent or the sale of the 
non-U.S. subsidiary.81 
Subpart F82 of the Code, however, is an exception to this general tax 
principle and attempts to tax currently U.S. parent corporations on specific 
types of income earned by their foreign subsidiaries.83 Subpart F imposes tax 
on “United States shareholder[s]” for income earned by “controlled foreign 
corporation[s]” (CFCs).84 A foreign corporation is a CFC if U.S. 
shareholders own more than fifty percent of either the foreign corporation’s 
voting power or the total value of its stock.85 A U.S. shareholder is defined as 
a “United States person” owning at least ten percent of the voting power or 
share value of a foreign corporation.86 U.S. shareholders are subject to tax on 
their pro rata share of a CFC’s “Subpart F income”87 which includes, among 
other categories, “foreign base company sales income” and “foreign personal 
holding company income,” both of which are subsets of § 952(a)(2) “foreign 
base company income.”88 Foreign base company sales income includes income 
derived from the sale of property sold to or initially purchased from a related 
person or sold or purchased on behalf of a related person, where the property 
was neither produced nor consumed in the CFC’s country of organization.89 
Foreign personal holding company income primarily contemplates passive 
income, such as dividends and interest income.90 
At first glance, it seems like Subpart F dictates that U.S.-based Apple Inc. 
must pay taxes on the income earned by Apple Operations Europe and Apple 
 
80 See I.R.C. § 61(a)(3) (including in gross income gains derived from property dealings); id. 
§ 1001(a) (providing the method for computing the “gain from the sale or other disposition of property” 
(emphasis added)); id. § 1001(c) (requiring the recognition of gain from the sale or exchange of property). 
81 See Fleming Jr. et al., supra note 78, at 1174. 
82 I.R.C. §§ 951-65. 
83 Darby & Lemaster, supra note 76, at 2. 
84 I.R.C. § 951(a)(1). For brevity’s sake, I use the term “U.S. shareholders” as a substitute for 
“United States shareholder[s]” in this Section. See id. 
85 Id. § 957(a). 
86 Id. § 951(b). U.S. persons include U.S. based corporations. See id. (cross-referencing id. 
§§ 957(c), 7701(a)(30)(C)). Ownership in the foreign corporation can be direct ownership, indirect 
ownership, or constructive ownership as determined by applying the attribution rules provided in 
§ 318(a) subject to some modifications. See id. §§ 951(b), 958(a)-(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.958-2(a), (c)-(d) 
(as amended in 2020). 
87 I.R.C. § 951(a)(1)(A); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.951-1(e) (as amended in 2019) (detailing the 
computation of a U.S. shareholder’s pro rata share of subpart F income). 
88 I.R.C. § 952(a)(2) (cross-referencing id. § 954(a)(1)-(2)). 
89 Id. § 954(d)(1). 
90 See id. § 954(c)(1) (including dividends, interest, royalties, rents, annuities, commodities 
gains and losses, and foreign currency gains and losses, among other items, within the definition of 
foreign personal holding company income). 
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Sales International. Apple Sales International’s and Apple Operations 
Europe’s sales appear to be foreign base company sales income, and any 
distributions from Apple Sales International to Apple Operations Europe or 
Apple Operations Europe to Apple Operations International appear to be 
foreign personal holding company income. 
Apple, however, avoided Subpart F and thus deferred U.S. tax on income 
generated by its foreign subsidiaries by using other parts of the Code and 
Treasury regulations. Apple primarily relied upon the “check-the-box” 
regulations, which allow a parent company’s wholly owned foreign subsidiary 
to be disregarded for tax purposes upon the subsidiary’s election to be treated 
as such.91 Apple’s election under these regulations rendered all its foreign 
subsidiaries, other than Apple Operations International, “disregarded 
entities.” Apple Sales International, Apple Operations Europe, and other 
foreign subsidiaries were all treated as part of Apple Operations International 
for tax purposes, and those subsidiaries’ transactions were treated as Apple 
Operations International’s transactions.92 
As such, Apple had no foreign base company income. Although 
distributions between these entities would ordinarily constitute foreign 
personal holding company income under Subpart F, the distributions were 
not attributable back to Apple Inc. because they were treated as occurring 
exclusively within Apple Operations International and not between different 
corporate entities. 
By treating all subsidiaries as part of Apple Operations International, 
income from inter-subsidiary sales of Apple products was not foreign base 
company sales income. Because the subsidiaries were disregarded, “it [was] 
as if no intercompany sales happened at all.”93 To distribute physical product 
to foreign markets, Apple Sales International purchased finished product 
from a third-party manufacturer, then resold the product to offshore 
distribution subsidiaries. These distribution subsidiaries then sold the 
product to end users.94 In form, the final sales to customers should have 
generated foreign base company sales income because they were “derived in 
connection with the purchase of personal property from a related person;” 
namely, the distribution subsidiaries’ purchases from Apple Sales 
 
91 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (as amended in 2019); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a), (b)(2) (as 
amended in 2020) (allowing a wholly owned foreign subsidiary properly characterized as a “[f]oreign 
eligible entity” to elect to be disregarded and treated as a division of its parent company); Levin & 
McCain, supra note 57, at 35-36 (describing how Apple avoiding paying Subpart F income tax by 
electing to disregard its wholly owned subsidiaries through the check-the-box regulations); see also 
Darby & Lemaster, supra note 76, at 12. 
92 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (“[I]f the entity is disregarded, its activities are treated in the 
same manner as a . . . division of the owner.”). 
93 Levin & McCain, supra note 57, at 36. 
94 Id. at 32 & fig. 
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International.95 However, because the check-the-box regulations rendered all 
subsidiaries besides Apple Operations International disregarded, Apple 
Operations International was effectively treated as the sole entity that 
purchased the product from a third-party manufacturer and made the sales to 
end consumers. 
Apple’s ability to circumvent Subpart F and thus defer U.S. tax elucidates 
the attractiveness of Ireland’s tax rulings issued to Apple. Apple secured a 
relatively low effective Irish tax rate on its subsidiaries’ earnings while 
structuring its operations to avoid tax on those subsidiaries’ Subpart F 
income. The use of the Code and accompanying Treasury regulations to avoid 
U.S. tax is not unique to Apple, nor is a tax ruling a necessary condition to 
avoiding U.S. tax liability. However, tax rulings, because of their potential to 
effectively reduce MNE tax liability in the issuing country below what the 
applicable tax laws seemingly mandate, can create more instances of and 
render more attractive tax-motivated income shifting. 
B. The OECD’s Earlier Work on Harmful Tax Practices 
The OECD has long noticed the ability of MNEs to shift income to low-
tax jurisdictions. It has also noticed the role of countries in encouraging this 
income shifting. The OECD’s first major attempt to address income shifting 
and tax competition was its report entitled Harmful Tax Competition (1998 
Report). The 1998 Report became the motivation and foundation of the 
OECD BEPS Project and tax ruling transparency. 
 
95 I.R.C. § 954(d)(1). Importantly, neither of the major exceptions to foreign base company 
sales income provided implicitly by the Code and explicitly by the Treasury regulations under § 954 
were applicable. Because the products sold were manufactured in China, the exceptions for property 
manufactured in the CFC’s country of incorporation and for property manufactured by the CFC, 
known as the manufacturing exceptions, were inapplicable. See id. § 954(d)(1)(A) (defining foreign 
base company sales income as income from sales of personal property “manufactured, produced, 
grown, or extracted outside the country under the laws of which the [CFC] is created or organized” 
(emphasis added)); Treas. Reg. § 1.954-3(a)(1)(i), (2), (4)(iii) (clarifying that the property sold must 
be manufactured outside the CFC’s country of organization to yield foreign base company sales 
income). Also, because the transactions were between Apple Sales International and the distribution 
subsidiaries, the exception for property consumed within the selling company’s country of 
incorporation was inapplicable. See I.R.C. § 954(d)(1)(B) (defining foreign base company sales 
income as income from sales of personal property “sold for use, consumption or disposition outside” 
the CFC’s country of organization (emphasis added)); Treas. Reg. § 1.954-3(a)(3). Accordingly, the 
use of the check-the-box regulations was crucial for Apple to avoid tax under Subpart F. 
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1. The 1998 Report 
The OECD began its work to combat income shifting by influencing 
national tax policies in the 1980s.96 At that time, taxpayers began using 
sophisticated international structures to exploit discrepancies among national 
tax laws, which agitated countries and frustrated their fundamental task of 
raising revenue.97 During this time, but before issuing the 1998 Report, the 
OECD offered some remedies to alleviate tax avoidance, such as model 
transfer pricing guidelines and bilateral tax conventions.98 In 1994, the 
OECD began approaching tax competition more directly, ultimately 
producing the 1998 Report.99 
The 1998 Report accomplishes two primary functions of “identifying 
harmful tax regimes and labeling tax havens.”100 The 1998 Report begins with 
the observation that countries use tax policies to attract financial and other 
mobile income from MNEs and individuals.101 The portion of the Report 
dedicated to harmful preferential tax regimes aims to identify tax policy that 
facilitates this sort of income diversion.102 
The 1998 Report proffered several primary factors for the OECD and 
countries to determine whether a tax regime is harmful and preferential. 
First, a regime would need to apply a low or zero effective tax rate on 
geographically mobile income.103 Geographically mobile income is income 
generated by activities “which can be most easily shifted in response to tax 
 
96 See Morriss & Moberg, supra note 32, at 33 (noting that the OECD began influencing tax 
policy in the 1980s to protect against tax competition that arose from taxpayers’ ability to shift 
income geographically). 
97 See id. at 33-39 (describing the evolution of “tax havens” in places like the Cayman Islands, 
and the resulting revenue losses to national tax collectors, as well as the tax-planning competition 
among large, developed economies). 
98 See H. David Rosenbloom, Noam Noked & Mohamed S. Helal, The Unruly World of Tax: A 
Proposal for an International Tax Cooperation Forum, 15 FLA. TAX REV. 57, 61-62 (2014) (noting the 
introduction of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital and the 1995 Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines). 
99 See Morriss & Moberg, supra note 32, at 39-40, 42-43 (describing the failure of the OECD’s 
first effort to combat tax competition, the “Project on Fiscal Degradation” (launched in 1994), and 
the ultimate success of the 1998 Report). 
100 Faulhaber, supra note 34, at 327. 
101 OECD, 1998 REPORT, supra note 7, ¶ 23. 
102 See id. ¶ 57 (“Many OECD Member and non-member countries have already established 
or are considering establishing preferential tax regimes to attract highly mobile financial and other 
service activities. . . . This section discusses factors that may help identify harmful preferential tax 
regimes, without targeting specific countries.”). 
103 Id. at 25-27; see also Faulhaber, supra note 34, at 329 (noting that the OECD considered tax regimes 
harmful when they “offered rates that were lower than the overall corporate rate in the jurisdiction”). 
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differentials,” such as financial and other service activities.104 To qualify as 
harmful and preferential, a regime would then need to either (1) be “ring-
fenced,” or one in which domestic taxpayers typically could not benefit from 
the regime; (2) operate with little transparency; or (3) not be subject to 
information sharing with other countries regarding the regime.105 
The 1998 Report concludes with recommended measures to combat 
harmful preferential regimes. It instructed OECD member countries to 
review their preferential regimes to determine whether they are harmful, and 
if found to be harmful, abolish the regimes or the regimes’ harmful aspects.106 
The Report also authorized countries to enact or strengthen defensive 
measures against harmful preferential regimes existing elsewhere, such as 
implementing or strengthening CFC rules107 similar to the U.S. Code’s 
Subpart F described above.108 In addition to the prescribed defensive 
measures, the OECD also created the Forum on Harmful Tax Practices 
(FHTP) to assist member countries in assessing and reviewing their 
preferential regimes.109 
C. The OECD BEPS Project and Tax Ruling Transparency 
The OECD’s work on harmful tax practices and income shifting did not 
end with the 1998 Report. In 2012, G-20 countries requested that the OECD 
develop a plan to address BEPS by MNEs.110 The OECD subsequently 
produced an action plan, which highlighted the impact of BEPS on countries’ 
tax bases and proffered broad measures to tackle BEPS.111 This action plan 
ultimately culminated in the introduction of the OECD BEPS Project in 2015.112 
 
104 OECD, 1998 REPORT, supra note 7, ¶¶ 57-58. Importantly, the 1998 Report explicitly 
excludes from its scope the use of tax incentives to attract investments in plants, building, and 
equipment. Id. ¶ 6. 
105 Id. at 27; see also Faulhaber, supra note 34, at 329. The Report provided other factors that 
can help with the determination as to whether a country’s tax regime is harmful and preferential, 
including the economic effects of the regime. OECD, 1998 REPORT, supra note 7, ¶¶ 68-84; see also 
Faulhaber, supra note 34, at 328 n.88. 
106 OECD, 1998 REPORT, supra note 7, at 56-57; see also Morriss & Moberg, supra note 32, at 45. 
107 OCED, 1998 REPORT, supra note 7, ¶¶ 86-87 (recommending unilateral defensive measures 
in addition to multilateral responses); see also id. ¶¶ 97-137 (providing examples of unilateral, 
bilateral, and multilateral defensive measures to combat harmful preferential tax regimes). 
108 See supra notes 82–90 and accompanying text. 
109 OECD, 1998 REPORT, supra note 7, annex I at 65-66; see also Faulhaber, supra note 34, at 328. 
110 OECD, BEPS ACTION PLAN, supra note 54, at 11. 
111 See id. at 7-26 (providing background on the problems posed by BEPS and laying out fifteen 
action items to counter BEPS). 
112 OECD, BACKGROUND BRIEF: INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK ON BEPS 7 (2017). 
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1. The OECD BEPS Project’s Actions 
The OECD BEPS Project is founded on three pillars: “coherence, 
substance, and transparency.”113 To this end, the “BEPS Package” consists of 
“soft law” tools,114 consistent with the foundational pillars, to help countries 
combat tax avoidance by MNEs.115 The aim of these tools is to ensure that 
profits are taxed “where economic activities generating the profits are 
performed and where value is created.”116 Essentially, the BEPS Package 
attempts to align the location of taxation and economic activity to stem 
artificial income shifting that serves no economic purpose. The OECD BEPS 
Project’s emphasis on coherence and transparency in international tax matters 
aid in this alignment. 
To effectuate these goals, the OECD BEPS Project recommends fifteen 
“Actions.”117 Generally, these Actions can be divided between “minimum 
standards” and other broad implementations, such as best practices.118 The 
minimum standards are policies that “[c]ountries and jurisdictions of 
relevance” must implement to achieve a “level playing field.”119 The broader 
implementations strive to reinforce desirable international tax standards and 
provide for best practices that participating countries should follow.120 
The Actions, which correspond to the aforementioned pillars, address 
more specific phenomena that facilitate tax avoidance. Action 1 deals with tax 
challenges unique to the current digital economy.121 Actions 2, 3, and 4 
attempt to instill coherence in international standards on matters such as 
CFC rules and interest deductibility.122 Actions 5 (in part)123 and 6 through 
10 help to ensure that substance governs taxation, rather than purely tax-
motivated structures.124 Actions 5 (in part)125 and 11 through 14 aim to 
enhance transparency in areas such as transfer pricing documentation and tax 
 
113 Biz, supra note 20, at 1055. 
114 OECD, OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT: 2015 FINAL 
REPORTS FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 5 (2015); see also Christians, supra note 20, at 1644-45 
(describing the features of the BEPS Package as “common forms of soft law governance”). 
115 What Is BEPS?, supra note 14. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 See OECD, 2018–2019 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 18, at 16, 21 (contrasting the 
“minimum standard” of Action 14 with the “best practice[]” recommendations of Actions 2, 3, and 4). 
119 What Is BEPS?, supra note 14. 
120 See OECD, 2018–2019 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 18, at 2. 
121 Biz, supra note 20, at 1055. 
122 OECD, 2018–2019 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 18, at 21. 
123 The portion of Action 5 that concerns substance is the work on preferential tax regimes. Id. at 2-3. 
124 OECD, 2019–2020 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 18, at 1, 18-20. 
125 The portion of Action 5 that concerns transparency is the exchange of information on tax 
rulings. OECD, 2018–2019 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 18, at 3. 
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ruling practices.126 Finally, Action 15 addresses the need to quickly implement 
the OECD BEPS Project’s Actions.127 
2. Action 5’s Transparency Framework 
Action 5 of the OECD BEPS Project, in part, mandates tax ruling 
transparency.128 More specifically, Action 5 calls for the “compulsory 
spontaneous exchange of information in respect of [tax] rulings,”129 which 
historically were confidential and not shared with other jurisdictions.130 The 
transparency framework applies to only some rulings. First, Action 5 covers 
only taxpayer-specific rulings as opposed to general rulings.131 General rulings 
are only contemplated by the transparency framework’s “best practices.”132 
Second, the rulings must be such that the absence of transparency would give 
rise to “BEPS concerns.”133 Action 5 explicitly contemplates the following 
rulings as potentially giving rise to BEPS concerns: (1) rulings pertaining to 
preferential regimes, (2) unilateral APAs or other cross-border rulings 
pertaining to transfer pricing, (3) cross-border rulings providing a downward 
adjustment to taxable profits, (4) permanent establishment (PE)134 rulings, 
 
126 Id. at 9, 14, annex B at 31-32. 
127 Biz, supra note 20, at 1055. 
128 The remainder of Action 5 concerns preferential regimes, a continuation of the OECD’s earlier 
work on the 1998 Report. See OECD, ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, ¶¶ 1-2, 23. 
129 Id. ¶¶ 91-94; see also OECD, TRANSFER PRICING DOCUMENTATION AND COUNTRY-BY-
COUNTRY REPORTING: ACTION 13 – 2015 FINAL REPORT ¶ 1; id. annex I to ch. V at 26; id. annex 
II to ch. V, at 28 (2015) [hereinafter OECD, ACTION 13 – 2015 FINAL REPORT] (requiring MNEs 
to document and share certain transfer pricing information, including tax rulings and APAs). 
130 Stuart Gibson, EU State Aid; More Cracks in the Wall of Secrecy, 80 TAX NOTES INT’L 473, 
473 (2015) (describing tax ruling practices in countries such as the Netherlands and U.S. and noting 
that these countries keep rulings “secret” and do not exchange them with other countries). 
131 OECD, ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, ¶ 102; see also Mindy Herzfeld, 
News Analysis, The End of Private Tax Rulings, 80 TAX NOTES INT’L 131, 132 (2015) (listing the six 
categories of taxpayer-specific rulings). 
132 OECD, ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, ¶ 102. 
133 Id. ¶ 91; see also Faulhaber, supra note 34, at 338 (“[R]ulings that could ‘give[] rise to BEPS 
concerns,’ . . . include five enumerated categories of rulings and can only include other types of 
rulings if all countries in the FHTP agree.” (quoting OECD, ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT, 
supra note 17, ¶ 120)). 
134 When an enterprise conducts business operations in a foreign country, the enterprise is 
generally subject to that country’s tax laws. However, if the enterprise’s residence country and the 
foreign country have a tax treaty, that treaty will, as is typical, provide for a minimum level of 
activity an enterprise must conduct to be subject to tax by the foreign country. This minimum level 
of activity is PE. What Is a Permanent Establishment?, BAKER TILLY US, LLP (Jan. 7, 2019), 
https://www.bakertilly.com/insights/what-is-a-permanent-establishment [https://perma.cc/VDR4-
GYW4]; see also OECD, PREVENTING THE ARTIFICIAL AVOIDANCE OF PERMANENT 
ESTABLISHMENT STATUS: ACTION 7 – 2015 FINAL REPORT 9 (2015) [hereinafter OECD, ACTION 
7 – 2015 FINAL REPORT] (“[T]he business profits of a foreign enterprise are taxable in a State only 
to the extent that the enterprise has in that State a permanent establishment (PE) to which the 
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(5) related party conduit rulings, and (6) any other type of ruling that the 
FHTP agrees would give rise to BEPS concerns in the absence of a 
spontaneous exchange of information.135 Third, the rulings must be either 
“future” or “past” rulings.136 Future rulings include those issued on or after 
April 1, 2016.137 Past rulings are those issued after January 1, 2010 and still in 
effect as of January 1, 2014.138 
Action 5 also indicates with whom the issuing country must exchange 
applicable rulings. In general, the issuing country “must automatically 
exchange” the ruling with countries that the ruling may affect,139 which 
includes the countries of residence of the immediate and ultimate parent 
companies of the taxpayer and the countries of residence of all related 
parties140 incident to the ruling.141 PE rulings also require an exchange with 
the residence country of the head office or the country of the PE, as the case 
may be, while related party conduit rulings require an additional exchange 
with the country of residence of the “ultimate beneficial owner . . . of 
payments made to the conduit.”142 
The OECD also prescribed practical implementation measures and best 
practices for the automatic exchange of information pertaining to tax rulings. 
For example, issuing countries should exchange future rulings as soon as 
possible but no later than three months after issuing the ruling, and recipient 
countries should ensure that taxpayer information contained in the ruling 
remains confidential.143 The best practices contemplate the process of granting 
 
profits are attributable.”). As such, a PE ruling can effectively determine whether an enterprise is 
subject to tax in a foreign country in which it operates. 
The requisite level of activity can differ across treaties. The U.S.-Ireland tax treaty, for example, 
defines PE as “a fixed place of business through which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly 
carried on” yet excludes, for example, storage facilities. Tax Convention, supra note 77, art. 5(1). 
135 OECD, ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, ¶ 91; see also Christians, supra note 
20, at 1632 (discussing the ways in which the OECD is developing the exchange of administrative 
rulings); Achim Pross, Kevin Shoom & Melissa Dejong, Harmful Tax Incentives Critically Curtailed: 
BEPS Action 5 in Action, INT’L TAX. REV., Nov. 2017, at 14, 14 (discussing the work on preferential 
tax regimes under BEPS Action 5). 
136 OECD, ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, ¶ 126 (emphasis omitted). There 
is no obligation to exchange past rulings if on or after September 1, 2017 the country either joined 
the Inclusive Framework or was identified as a “jurisdiction of relevance.” OECD, BEPS ACTION 
5 ON HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES – TRANSPARENCY FRAMEWORK 10 (2021). 
137 OECD, ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, ¶ 129. 
138 Id. ¶ 126; see also Mindy Herzfeld, News Analysis, Looking Forward to 2016, 80 TAX NOTES 
INT’L 985, 986 (2015). 
139 Faulhaber, supra note 34, at 333. 
140 Two parties are related if one has at least a 25% investment in the other or a third party has at 
least a 25% investment in the two parties. OECD, ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, ¶ 122. 
141 See id. ¶ 121. 
142 Id. ¶ 124. 
143 Id. ¶¶ 133-40. 
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a ruling, the time period of the ruling’s effect, and the publication of rulings.144 
Moreover, the exchanged information should include a summary of the 
transaction at issue as well as an indication of the recipient entity’s profit.145 
Since the promulgation of Action 5’s transparency framework, 
participating countries have actively exchanged tax rulings. The OECD 
reviews participating countries’ exchange practices annually146 and issues 
Progress Reports detailing the amount of exchange and the level of 
compliance.147 As of July 2020, countries participating in the OECD BEPS 
Project exchanged approximately 18,000 rulings.148 Currently, OECD review 
indicates that 80 out of 112 jurisdictions did not receive any recommendations 
regarding their exchange practices pursuant to Action 5.149 However, during 
review, the OECD made 55 recommendations to 32 jurisdictions, indicating 
that some jurisdictions are not fully complying with Action 5’s framework.150 
But what happens when a country fails to comply with Action 5’s exchange 
requirement? And of greater concern: what happens when a country issues a 
ruling, but the ruling’s subject matter deviates from a normal application of the 
country’s tax laws, regardless of whether the country exchanges the ruling or 
not? And what happens when this ruling deviates from an OECD BEPS Project 
Action or other OECD guidance? This Comment addresses what enforcement 
measures the OECD BEPS Project contemplates for these violative tax rulings. 
The OECD BEPS Project does not contemplate direct repercussions for 
violative tax rulings. In 2018, the OECD recommended that countries impose 
penalties on MNEs that fail to satisfy the substantial activities requirement 
with respect to preferential regimes addressed in Action 5. But it does not 
seem that any countries have instituted this recommendation, and the 
suggestion is fundamentally flawed because it places the responsibility of 
penalizing MNEs on the country instituting the harmful preferential regime 
in the first place, seemingly ignoring that these regimes are designed to induce 
artificial income shifting.151 Additionally, there are no direct penalties imposed 
 
144 Id. ¶ 141. 
145 Id. annex C at 78-79. 
146 See Grinberg, supra note 20, at 1165. 
147 Action 5: Harmful Tax Practices, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/beps-
actions/action5/#:~:text=The%20Forum%20on%20Harmful%20Tax,tax%20base%20of%20other%20j
urisdictions [https://perma.cc/3MJ9-N92D] (stating that the FHTP will conduct the peer review 
and monitoring process with respect to Action 5’s transparency framework). 
148 OECD, 2019–2020 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 18, at 16. 
149 Id. 
150 See id. 
151 In 2018, the OECD issued a report (2018 Report) concerning the substantial activities 
requirement of Action 5’s guidance with respect to harmful preferential regimes. OECD, 
RESUMPTION OF APPLICATION OF SUBSTANTIAL ACTIVITIES FACTOR TO NO OR ONLY 
NOMINAL TAX JURISDICTIONS ¶¶ 21-23 (2018). To ensure compliance with the substantial 
activities requirement, the OECD recommends that a jurisdiction that has the preferential regime 
 
1570 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 169: 1545 
on an issuing country if the ruling’s subject matter violates an OECD BEPS 
Project Action, other OECD guidance, or a normal application of the issuing 
country’s tax laws.152 Only limited defensive measures,153 designed to mitigate 
the adverse tax consequences of the ruling to the MNE’s residence country, 
are available when a violative ruling adversely impacts another country.154 For 
example, if a ruling pertains to a preferential regime later found to be harmful 
under Action 5 and the issuing country fails to abolish the harmful preferential 
regime, affected countries may only take authorized defensive measures to 
counteract the effects of that regime.155 The affected country could not, for 
 
enact a “sanction mechanism” to ensure compliance. Id. ¶ 42; see also Jefferey Kadet, BEPS Primer: 
Past, Present, Future, 168 TAX NOTES FED. 45, 54 (2020) (“[T]o ensure compliance, companies 
subject to these rules would have to report on their activities and be subject to sanctions for 
noncompliance.”). While this recommendation does not apply to the tax ruling transparency portion 
of Action 5 directly, because rulings relating to preferential regimes are subject to exchange the 
recommendation still needs to be addressed. First, there is no mention in either of the BEPS Project 
Progress Reports after the 2018 Report of any jurisdiction that has implemented this type of sanction 
mechanism. See OECD, 2019–2020 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 18, at 14-17; OECD, 2018–2019 
PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 18, at 9-10. Moreover, the sanction mechanism recommendation is 
theoretically flawed. Countries implement preferential regimes to induce income shifting to those 
countries. By sanctioning firms for utilizing preferential regimes without complying with the 
substantial activities requirement, countries would effectively and simultaneously encourage and 
discourage preferential regime induced income shifting. As such, there is no incentive for countries 
to sanction such firms because these countries want to induce income shifting. See infra Section II.A. 
Additionally, the determination of whether an MNE complied with the substantial activities 
requirement would have to stem from review of that MNEs annual country-by-country reporting 
under Action 13. However, this information is confidential. OECD, ACTION 13 – 2015 FINAL 
REPORT, supra note 129, annex IV to ch. V at 43 ¶ 2. Because this information is confidential, there 
is not an effective way for parties other than the country and MNE at issue to know whether that 
MNE failed to satisfy the substantial activities requirement. Accordingly, the 2018 Report’s 
recommendation does not warrant any consideration when determining whether the OECD 
contemplates penalties or sanctions with respect to tax rulings. 
152 A violation of the relevant country’s tax laws would most likely constitute a ruling that would 
give rise to BEPS concerns to the extent that the violation induced artificial income shifting, which 
would subject the ruling to Action 5’s exchange. See supra notes 133–35 and accompanying text. 
153 OECD, ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, ¶ 22 (authorizing the use of 
defensive measures listed in the 1998 Report); see also CÉCILE REMEUR, UNDERSTANDING BEPS: 
FROM TAX AVOIDANCE TO DIGITAL TAX CHALLENGES, EUR. PARLIAMENTARY RSCH. SERV., 
PE 642.258 4 (2019) (noting that some BEPS Actions contemplate defensive measures). 
Implementing or strengthening CFC rules, such as the Code’s Subpart F, is an example of an 
allowable defensive measure. OECD, 1998 REPORT, supra note 7, at 40-42. 
154 Action 5’s discussion on defensive measures only appears in the portion concerning harmful 
preferential regimes. See OECD, ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, ¶ 22. However, 
countries routinely implement these authorized measures by means of their sovereign taxing power 
to combat tax avoidance caused by income shifting, regardless of whether firms avoid tax by utilizing 
harmful preferential regimes. Accordingly, whether or not Action 5 explicitly authorizes the use of 
these measures to combat tax ruling induced income shifting is irrelevant, and this Comment will 
assume these measures are available to combat such income shifting. 
155 See OECD, ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, ¶ 22 (authorizing countries to 
use defensive measures when another country fails to abolish a harmful preferential regime). 
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example, impose sanctions on the issuing country. However, as even the 
OECD admits, the prescribed defensive measures’ efficacy is questionable.156 
Notably, Action 5 does not discuss any direct measures to deter MNEs 
from utilizing violative rulings. There is no mechanism to force MNEs to 
disgorge unwarranted tax concessions, nor are there penalties for capitalizing 
on violative tax rulings. Moreover, the authorized defensive measures are 
inadequate to prevent MNEs from utilizing these rulings. However, in other 
areas of law, the OECD observes that some form of deterrence is necessary 
for compliance. For example, in the context of competition law, the OECD 
readily admits that penalties or sanctions are necessary to deter violations. A 
report published by the OECD notes that “[f]ines play a role in deterrence 
by making unlawful conduct less profitable. Breaking competition laws is 
profitable if it goes undetected. From the perspective of a pure profit-
maximising company, it will not violate the law if the expected monetary 
sanctions are greater than the expected illegal gain.”157 The fundamental 
parallels between tax avoidance and violating antitrust laws suggest that a 
firm would deploy a similar profit maximizing analysis when considering tax 
avoidance. If anything, tax avoidance is an easier application of this analysis 
because tax avoidance is legal, making it prima facie more socially acceptable 
than violating antitrust law, notwithstanding any criminal sanctions 
associated with the latter. So, as the OECD BEPS Project does not 
contemplate measures that can adequately frustrate the net benefits of tax 
avoidance, there is only upside from utilizing favorable tax rulings, which 
raises suspicion as to the optimism pertaining to the anticipated behavioral 
responses of the transparency framework. 
II. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF ACTION 5 AND THE COMPLEMENTARITY 
OF TRANSPARENCY AND DISGORGEMENT 
Action 5’s transparency framework alone is unlikely to produce the 
behavioral changes contemplated and desired by the OECD. This Part 
provides a formal, yet approachable, economic analysis to illustrate the 
theoretical behavioral changes resulting from transparency. It shows that 
transparency alone will not create even modest behavioral changes by either 
 
156 E.g., OECD, 1998 REPORT, supra note 7, ¶¶ 89, 91 (noting that “in the absence of 
international cooperation [in implementing defensive measures] there is little incentive for a country 
which provides a harmful preferential tax regime to eliminate it” because MNEs can easily shift their 
income to other jurisdictions and positing that while “unilateral measures are easiest for countries to 
adopt . . . . multilateral responses . . . which are the most difficult to adopt . . . . are essential”). 
157 SEMIN PARK, OECD, SANCTIONS IN ANTITRUST CASES 5 (2016), 
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/GF(2016)6/en/pdf [https://perma.cc/QXR3-P47V]. 
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MNEs or countries, but would create significant behavioral changes when 
accompanied by a disgorgement mechanism. 
A. Expected Behavioral Responses Following Action 5’s Transparency Framework 
It is first important to note that taxes affect firm decisionmaking. Like any 
other input cost, taxes create negative pressure on, or reduce, profit. As such, 
imposing taxes can affect real economic activity, such as location and 
investment decisions.158 The free flow of capital, goods, and services across 
international borders has increased MNE sensitivity, or responsiveness, to 
potential taxes, as MNEs can more easily alter their organizational structure 
to optimize tax costs.159 However, in some instances tax costs do not affect 
real economic activity, such as output or supply chain decisions, but still 
motivate firms to artificially shift their income. Although Action 5’s 
transparency framework is broad—as it seemingly applies to rulings involving 
all types of income rather than solely geographically mobile income 
contemplated in the 1998 Report and Action 5’s portion dedicated to 
preferential regimes—tax rulings typically facilitate this artificial income 
shifting.160 
Action 5’s transparency framework alone cannot adequately combat the 
use of tax rulings to facilitate artificial income shifting. A country will issue 
a favorable ruling when the benefits of doing so exceed the costs. An MNE 
will artificially shift income to the issuing country when the ruling renders 
income shifting the profit-maximizing alternative. Action 5 will not prevent 
the practice of using favorable rulings to induce income shifting because 
neither transparency nor the authorized defensive measures will affect the 
ruling’s net benefits to the issuing country or the utility to the MNE. 
1. In the Absence of Transparency 
Acknowledging that tax costs affect firm behavior improves the analysis 
of tax rulings and income shifting. This subsection will first model firm and 
country behavior before the introduction of Action 5 and its transparency 
 
158 OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 28 (2013) (“[T]ax affects 
decisions on where and how to invest.”). 
159 Id. at 25. 
160 Giraud & Petit, supra note 29, at 234 (noting that MNEs have been using transfer pricing to 
reduce tax liability for decades and that MNEs are “increasingly agile at locating their revenues and profits 
in the jurisdiction of their choosing”); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Haiyan Xu, Global Taxation After the Crisis: 
Why BEPS and MAATM are Inadequate Responses, and What Can Be Done About It 22 (U. Mich. Pub. L. & 
Legal Theory Rsch. Paper No. 494, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2716124 
(“[A] lack of transparency in connection with certain [tax] rulings ha[s] been widely used by MNEs for 
artificial profit shifting.” (emphasis added)). 
2021] Is Sunlight the Best Disinfectant? 1573 
framework. In this model, let F be an MNE with country k source income, 
which was not artificially shifted to country k but is able to be artificially 
shifted. F must decide whether and where to artificially shift this income 
among a set of countries, S. F’s generalized after-tax profit function is 
Π(q, t) = R(q) – C(q, t),161 
where profit, Π, is a function of the quantity, q, of goods or services sold or 
other income producing property either sold or otherwise generating income 
for F162 and of taxes, t, that F must pay. R(q) and C(q, t) are F’s revenue and 
cost functions, respectively. Moreover, for every increase in the F’s tax cost, 
F’s costs will increase, which is characterizable using the first order partial 
derivative of the cost function with respect to t: 
!"($,&)
!&
 > 0 ∀t ∈ ℝ. 





 < 0 ∀t ∈ ℝ. 
	  
 
161 The profit function represents the present value of F’s profit across n periods where n ∈ [1, 
2, 3, . . .] and represents the number of periods F will evaluate if it receives a ruling. This is the 
appropriate consideration because MNEs that shift income generally ought to consider the total 
value of a tax concession across all relevant periods and rulings can afford tax concessions across 
multiple time periods. For example, the rulings Ireland issued to Apple provided tax benefits to 
Apple across multiple years. 
162 For example, interest earned by F is income producing property that is not sold but still 
produces income for F. 
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Because F seeks to maximize its after-tax profit, it will “leave” its income 
in country k because it is assumed that F’s profit from leaving such income in 
country k yields a higher profit for F than if it shifted its income to any other 
country in S,163 or 
Πk(qk, tk) > Πi(qi, ti) ∀i ∈ S/{k}.164 
Suppose country j wants F to shift the income there rather than leave it 
in country k. Because F is artificially shifting income, there is no need for F 
to restructure its operations to shift this income, which otherwise would 
impose income shifting costs on F. So, there are no shifting costs that country 
j would need to offset to induce the income shifting. Also, because F is 
artificially shifting income, any incentives designed to affect real economic 
activity, such as manufacturing subsidies or other related state-provided 
assistance, will be ineffective to induce F to shift its income to country j. As 
such, a tax cost reduction larger than the difference in F’s profit generated by 
leaving the income in country k rather than shifting it to country j is likely 
the only way to induce F to shift its income to country j. To decrease F’s tax 
liability such that country j becomes the profit maximizing location, country 
j will issue a tax ruling. 
In general, tax rulings are preferable to enacting favorable domestic tax law 
for three reasons. First, legislative changes occur slowly.165 Second, tax rulings 
 
163 Absent a tax ruling, country k can be the profit maximizing location for several reasons. For 
example, country k may impose the lowest effective tax rate on the type of income at issue. 
Additionally, because F’s profit maximizing quantity is country specific, income shifting may lead to 
a lower profit even if there exists some other country that would impose a lower effective tax rate 
on the income absent a ruling. 
164 The profit functions here include subscripts to denote F’s profit from shifting its income to 
a specific country. The profit maximizing quantity and tax cost also include such subscripts. While 
denoting the tax cost by each country is necessary because countries impose different tax costs, the 
profit maximizing quantity may not be country specific because this model analyzes the income 
shifting due to favorable tax rulings, which generally involves artificial profit shifting. Generally, 
artificial income shifting for tax avoidance purposes is unlikely to generate real economic effects, 
such as effects on the profit maximizing quantity, because tax-motivated income shifting does not 
typically require operational adjustments. See What Is BEPS?, supra note 14 (“BEPS refers to tax 
planning strategies . . . to artificially shift profits to low or no-tax locations where there is little or no 
economic activity . . . .” (emphasis added)). However, because there could conceivably be different 
profit maximizing quantities depending on where a firm shifts its income, this comment will 
continue to denote the profit maximizing quantity by the location of such income. 
165 See, e.g., Writing and Enacting Tax Legislation, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/taxes/pages/writing.aspx [https://perma.cc/E2FZ-
KCC4] (last updated Dec. 5, 2010, 10:28 AM). Political infighting within legislative bodies and the 
need to address other policy matters can also frustrate tax law changes. See, e.g., Rocky Mengle, 
President Biden’s Tax Plans for the Next Few Years, KIPLINGER (Feb. 3, 2021) 
https://www.kiplinger.com/taxes/602109/president-bidens-tax-plans-for-the-next-few-years 
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can be targeted at a specific taxpayer while tax law changes are broadly applicable. 
Even if a ruling is a general ruling, it can still be targeted toward a specific type 
of transaction, and depending on the frequency of that transaction type, the 
general ruling could have the same effect as a taxpayer-specific ruling.166 Third, 
tax rulings are more discrete than a tax law change,167 which can mitigate any 
political backlash from providing a tax concession to a foreign MNE. 
In the model, a tax ruling that aims to reduce F’s tax cost must place enough 
downward pressure on F’s tax cost to render country j a more attractive income 
location than country k. More specifically, the tax concession afforded by the 
ruling, denoted ∆tj, must reduce F’s tax cost to increase F’s profit by an amount 
greater than the difference between F’s profit in country k and F’s pre-ruling 
profit in country j. The necessary increase can be expressed as the inequality 
!(($),&))
!&
 × ∆tj > Πk(qk, tk) − Πj(qj, tj), 
where the left side of the inequality is the linearly approximated168 change in 
F’s profit following the ruling and the right side is the difference between F’s 
profit in country k and F’s pre-ruling profit in country j. The inequality can 
be simplified when considering that the first order partial derivative of F’s 
profit evaluated at any point will be -1, following some simplifying 
assumptions.169 That is, a one dollar increase in tax results in a one dollar 
decrease in after-tax profit. So, 
 
[https://perma.cc/5Q8R-367W] (suggesting that Republican influence and prioritization of the 
COVID-19 pandemic could delay President Biden’s tax policy agenda). 
166 See, e.g., Understanding IRS Guidance, supra note 43 (defining a Revenue Ruling, which is a 
general ruling, as a “conclusion of the IRS on how the law is applied to a specific set of facts” without 
imposing any constraint on the specificity of either the transaction type or factual background, which 
suggests that general rulings can offer guidance on an extremely narrow set of facts). 
167 Compare Other IRS Guidance, GEO. L. LIBR., https://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/
c.php?g=271147&p=2724631 [https://perma.cc/NV43-GJYD] (last updated Mar. 11, 2021, 2:50 PM) (explaining 
that private letter rulings are not published in a reporter and identifying information is redacted), with How 
Our Laws Are Made, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/help/learn-about-the-legislative-
process/how-our-laws-are-made [https://perma.cc/PYS5-7KQ6] (describing the U.S. legislative process and 
noting the public access to the process and final legislation, including public hearings, broadcast of live 
coverage of floor proceedings, and publication of the final legislation). 
168 A linear approximation is the approximated change of a function due to a change in one of 
its variables. The approximated change of a function is measured by multiplying the first order 
partial derivative of a function with respect to one of its variables (here, 
!"($%,'%)
!'
) by the actual 




 × ∆tj = |∆tj|, F must not otherwise use the tax savings afforded by the ruling 
to generate additional income. For example, F could earn interest on the tax cost savings afforded 
by the ruling. Because F theoretically could generate additional income from the tax savings, the 
model began with the linear approximation to express F’s change in profit from the tax concession. 
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!(($),&))
!&
 × ∆tj 
can be expressed as the absolute value170 of the change in F’s tax cost following 
the ruling, which simplifies the inequality to 
|∆tj| > Πk(qk, tk) − Πj(qj, tj).171 
Therefore, when the tax concession satisfies the inequality, F will shift its 
income to country j instead of leaving it in country k.172 
Country j would offer such a concession when the benefits of F shifting its 
income to country j exceed any costs to country j resulting from the ruling, or 
uj > cj, 
where uj and cj denote the benefits to and costs incurred by country j, respectively. 
These costs and benefits must be identified by evaluating actual countries’ 
experiences from facilitating tax avoidance. Countries primarily incur 
political costs by acting as tax avoidance centers, though the countries’ 
residents may also suffer welfare costs.173 Although countries generally do not 
 
To make the inequality and subsequent analysis simpler, it is assumed that F cannot otherwise use 
the tax savings to generate income in addition to the income resulting from a reduced tax cost. 
170 The tax concession must be expressed as the absolute value because the change in F’s tax 
cost is a negative number. 
171 For the remainder of this Comment Πk(qk, tk) and Πj(qj, tj) will be expressed as Πk and Πj, 
respectively. 
172 Two points are worth addressing. First, it is possible that country j’s tax ruling would 
produce feedback effects, possibly inducing country k to issue its own tax ruling to F. It is also 
possible that country j could intend to issue its ruling following an intention by country k to do so. 
To generalize the model’s conclusions, tk in Πk(qk, tk) shall be interpreted as country k’s “best offer,” 
which may include a favorable ruling issued by country k. 
Second, some may question the sequence of events involved; that is, country j will issue its ruling 
before F decides whether to shift its income there. It is natural to think that F would first have to actually 
shift its income before either country could or would issue a tax ruling affording favorable tax treatment 
to F. However, income shifting accompanied by tax rulings typically occur in the manner implicit in 
the model, that is, the MNE first secures a favorable ruling with a tax jurisdiction and then subsequently 
structures itself to utilize the ruling. See, e.g., Dina Gusovsky, Taxes, Multinational Firms & Luxembourg 
– Revealed, CNBC (Nov. 7, 2014, 8:57 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2014/11/06/taxes-multinational-
firms-luxembourgrevealed.html [https://perma.cc/AXT8-XLDN] (noting that, in Luxembourg, 
companies often first consult with the tax authority to get a tax ruling approved which then gives them 
“the green light” for structuring their operations to benefit from the ruling); see also id. (noting that 
many tax rulings are preapproved, which is “the equivalent of a foreign firm coming to the United 
States and arranging its tax burden with the IRS in advance”). 
173 See, e.g., Brooke Harrington, Why Tax Havens are Political and Economic Disasters, ATLANTIC 
(July 28, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/07/tax-haven-curse/491411 
[https://perma.cc/RZ38-ASML] (finding that acting as a conduit for tax avoidance may depress 
resident income through an increased cost of living). These welfare costs are externalities, as they 
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want to be perceived as tax avoidance centers174 because that perception 
adversely impacts their international reputation, the actual costs incurred 
from this reputational harm are generally negligible.175 Even widely 
publicized accounts of countries aiding tax avoidance often do not induce 
significant directed responses from affected jurisdictions.176 The benefits, 
however, of becoming tax avoidance centers primarily include increased tax 
revenues,177 as well as possible increases in employment178 and economic 
growth.179 Overall, however, countries generally receive different benefits 
when they induce artificial income shifting in comparison to obtaining 
ordinary foreign direct investment (FDI).180 
 
are not borne directly by the tax authority issuing the ruling or the MNE receiving the ruling. 
Therefore, it is possible that the taxing authority would not even consider such costs when deciding 
to issue the ruling. 
174 See, e.g., Will Goodbody, The Apple Tax Case Appeal: All You Need to Know, RTÉ (Sept. 15, 
2019, 7:44 PM), https://www.rte.ie/news/analysis-and-comment/2019/0915/1075817-apple-tax-
appeal-explained [https://perma.cc/JX2C-5APB](noting the Irish government’s “strong[]” denial of 
claims that Ireland is a tax haven); Gusovsky, supra note 172 (“A spokesman for Luxembourg’s 
Minister of Finance . . . strongly rejects the assertion that Luxembourg is a tax haven and said that 
his country fully complies with European and international law in tax matters.”). It is important to 
note that this Section focuses on the costs and benefits to countries in the absence of tax ruling 
transparency. Possible modifications to these variables following tax ruling transparency will be 
discussed in infra subsection II.A.2. 
175 See, e.g., Cayman Islands Added to the EU List of Non-Cooperative Jurisdictions: Practical Impact 
for Cayman Island Funds and Their Managers, DECHERT LLP (Feb. 19, 2020), 
https://www.dechert.com/content/dechert/en/knowledge/onpoint/2020/2/cayman-islands-added-to-
the-eu-list-of-non-cooperative-jurisdict.html [https://perma.cc/YH44-NW8T] (noting that the 
Cayman Islands’ addition to the E.U. blacklist due to the former’s tax practices “is not expected to 
impact Cayman Islands funds ability to raise capital from global investors”). 
176 See, e.g., Simon Bowers, Why Has the European Commission Not Investigated LuxLeaks Tax Deals?, INT’L 
CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.icij.org/investigations/
luxembourg-leaks/why-has-the-european-commission-not-investigated-lux-leaks-tax-deals [https://perma.cc/
2TQ8-M4LB] (noting the European Commission’s laggard response following the LuxLeaks scandal). 
177 See, e.g., Faulhaber, supra note 34, at 311-12 (noting that countries provide low tax rates and 
selectively treat taxpayers to, in part, attract revenues). As mentioned, countries typically raise only a sliver 
of tax revenue from artificially shifted income. See, e.g., Gusovsky, supra note 172 (“[T]he Luxembourg tax 
on $50 million of interest income running through the country . . . would be less than $100,000.”). 
178 Employment increases are likely slight, if not absent, because mobile income shifting does 
not involve significant firm investments in, for example, manufacturing plants, which would create 
more significant employment. See, e.g., Gusovsky, supra note 172 (noting that LuxLeaks involved 
companies shifting income to Luxembourg companies with, in the words of Professor Steven 
Plotnick, “no tangible activities”); Levin & McCain, supra note 57, at 9-10 (noting that U.S. 
multinational income shifting typically involves shell companies, which have no employees and do 
not produce goods). 
179 See Harrington, supra note 173 (noting the “influx of cash” and boon to jobs and revenues 
in countries that establish themselves as tax avoidance centers). 
180 Such benefits include an increase in employment and new technologies. See Prakash 
Loungani & Assaf Razin, How Beneficial Is Foreign Direct Investment for Developing Countries?, FIN. 
& DEV., June 2001, at 6, 7 (describing how FDI leads to the transfer of technology and the 
development of the host nation’s human capital through employee training programs). 
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In issuing a favorable ruling to F, country j will attempt to maximize its 
benefits and minimize its costs. The smaller the tax concession to F, the 
greater the difference between these costs and benefits, as a smaller 
concession will yield higher tax revenues and mitigate the perception that 
country j is a tax avoidance center. Therefore, the value of the tax concession 
afforded to F will likely be just large enough to render country j the profit 
maximizing location. 
2. Incorporating Action 5’s Tax Ruling Transparency 
The previous subsection modeled the necessary conditions for a tax ruling 
to induce income shifting as: 
|∆tj| > Πk − Πj and uj > cj. 
This subsection incorporates the expected consequences of Action 5’s 
transparency framework, including the prescribed defensive measures, and 
adjusts these necessary conditions to account for these consequences. 
Although some advocates suggest that transparency will deter egregious forms 
of tax avoidance,181 there is no empirical evidence on the effect of tax ruling 
transparency.182 However, incorporating Action 5’s transparency framework 
into the above model does not yield any significant theoretical changes to the 
conditions required for a tax ruling to induce income shifting. As such, tax 
ruling transparency will not result in significant behavioral changes by either 
MNEs in utilizing or tax authorities in issuing violative tax rulings. 
The OECD BEPS Project’s transparency framework has no theoretical 
effect on firm behavior. As demonstrated above, any favorable tax ruling 
decreases a firm’s tax cost. A decrease in a firm’s tax cost increases their after-
tax profit. For transparency to create behavioral changes, transparency itself 
must frustrate the utility of the tax ruling by, for example, imposing a cost on 
a firm accepting the tax concession afforded by the favorable tax ruling. 
Because acceptance of a tax concession has no causal relation with a firm’s 
input costs, the only conceivable cost associated with acts of tax avoidance 
must be a cost to the firm’s reputation, denoted r(∆t),183 which could manifest 
 
181 See, e.g., OECD, 2018–2019 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 18, at 9 (noting that transparency 
will deter governments from offering “‘sweetheart’ deals” to foreign MNEs); Neubig, supra note 19, at 
1140 (“[T]ransparency . . . will discourage the most egregious tax planning activity of MNEs . . . .”). 
182 See Neubig, supra note 19, at 1150 (noting that open research opportunities include empirical 
analysis of government behavioral changes following greater tax ruling transparency). 
183 The reputational harm to a firm accepting a favorable tax concession is expressed as a 
function of the magnitude of the tax concession because as the magnitude of the tax concession 
increases so too does the supposed egregiousness of the firm’s tax avoidance. Therefore, it is rather 
apparent that more egregious tax avoidance produces more expected reputational damage from that avoidance. 
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itself as injurious to consumer perception of the firm and thus the firm’s sales 
and its perceived value.184 With the incorporation of reputational harm into 
the above model, the tax concession would now have to satisfy 
|∆tj| − r(∆tj) > Πk − Πj 
for F to shift its income to country j rather than leaving it in country k. 
However, the reputational harm stemming from ruling-induced tax avoidance 
is minimal, if not nonexistent.185 As such, r(∆tj) roughly equals zero. So, if a 
tax concession satisfies 
|∆tj| > Πk − Πj 
when there is no transparency, then it will satisfy 
|∆tj| − r(∆tj) > Πk − Πj 
when there is tax ruling transparency. Therefore, transparency alone does not 
discourage firms from utilizing favorable tax rulings to shift income. 
Moreover, the defensive measures186 authorized by Action 5 cannot 
remedy transparency’s inability to affect MNE behavior. The defensive 
measures, which include those from the 1998 Report, primarily seek to 
combat tax avoidance and base erosion through enhanced CFC rules and their 
analogs with respect to non-corporate entities.187 These rules, in theory, stem 
avoidance by taxing certain types of income attributable to foreign owned 
entities, including income artificially shifted to utilize favorable tax rulings. 
As such, with Action 5’s authorization of defensive measures, there is now 
some probability, φ, of F’s residence country taking defensive measures that 
 
184 Birgit Huesecken, Michal Overesch & Alexander Tassius, Effects of Disclosing Tax 
Avoidance: Capital Market Reaction to LuxLeaks 1, 16 (Feb. 2018) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2848757 (“Excessive tax avoidance 
may . . . lead to reputational consequences, such as consumers choosing to buy from the [tax 
avoiding] firm’s competitors . . . .”). 
185 One study analyzed firm share prices after the LuxLeaks disclosure of confidential tax 
rulings issued by Luxembourg and generally found no evidence of reputational harm to firms. See 
id. (manuscript at 6). Even if there is some reputational harm, the harm did not outweigh the 
positive effect on firm value stemming from effective tax planning, which suggests negative publicity 
from tax avoidance does not impose net costs on firms. Id.; see also John Gallemore, Edward L. 
Maydew & Jacob R. Thornock, The Reputational Costs of Tax Avoidance, 31 CONTEMP. ACCT. RSCH. 
1103, 1105 (2014) (concluding that there is no empirical evidence to support the proposition that tax 
avoidance and tax sheltering have reputational consequences for firms). 
186 See supra notes 153–55 and accompanying text. 
187 OECD, 1998 REPORT, supra note 7, at 40-42. 
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impose some residence country effective tax rate, τ, on F’s post-ruling profit 
if F shifts its income to country j.188 Now the tax concession must satisfy 
|∆tj| - φτ(|∆tj| + Πj) > Πk − Πj, 
which can be simplified to 
(1 - φτ)(|∆tj| + Πj) > Πk.189 
However, these anti-tax avoidance rules are often easily circumvented or too 
weak to lessen the tax benefits of income shifting.190 As a result, τ is 
 
188 The value of φ depends on whether F’s residence country has existing defensive measures. 
If F’s residence country has existing defensive measures, then φ = 1. If F’s residence country has not 
already taken defense measures, then φ ∈ [0, 1]. 
189 This analysis assumes F is risk neutral. This analysis also ignores the possibility that F’s 
residence country would take defensive measures if F were to shift its income to country k. 
190 See, e.g., supra notes 82–95 and accompanying text; OFF. OF TAX POL’Y, DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, THE DEFERRAL OF INCOME EARNED THROUGH U.S. CONTROLLED FOREIGN 
CORPORATIONS 62-67 (2000) (providing various strategies by which MNEs avoid the Code’s 
Subpart F and concluding that Subpart F may be ineffective); EUR. COMM’N, TAX POLICIES IN 
THE EUROPEAN UNION: 2020 SURVEY 94 (2020) (noting that CFC rules provided in the E.U. 
directives could not eliminate “aggressive tax planning”); JOSEPH ISENBERGH & BRET WELLS, 
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 370 (4th ed. 2020) (“[T]he Subpart F regime as currently constructed 
does generally allow broad latitude to the U.S. [MNEs] to engage in the full range of base erosion 
strategies between its [CFCs] when those strategies are directed at the foreign-to-foreign context”); 
Fleming Jr. et al., supra note 78, at 1181 (noting that the TCJA did not alter the check-the-box 
regulations, which allow taxpayers to avoid Subpart F and taxation under § 951A); Scott D. Dyreng, 
Fabio B. Gaertner, Jeffrey L. Hoopes & Mary E. Vernon, The Effect of U.S. Tax Reform on the Tax 
Burdens of U.S. Domestic and Multinational Corporations 19 (June 2020) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3620102 (“[F]irms that were 
targeted by GILTI [global intangible low-tax income] . . . appear to pay no more federal tax on 
foreign earnings in the post-TCJA period than they did in the pre-TCJA period.”); see also OECD, 
DESIGNING EFFECTIVE CONTROLLED FOREIGN COMPANY RULES: ACTION 3 – 2015 FINAL 
REPORT 9 (2015) (noting that many “existing CFC rules . . . have design features that do not tackle 
BEPS effectively” and recommending designs for more effective CFC rules); Kadet, supra note 151, 
at 52-53 (explaining that Action 3 does not proffer any minimum standards that would create 
effective CFC rules); Michael C. Durst, The OECD’s BEPS Project and Lower-Income Countries, 90 
TAX NOTES INT’L 1157, 1168-69 (2018) (noting that political pressures have rendered CFC rules 
“relatively toothless” and the OECD “ma[de] no move toward advocacy of a global network of strict 
CFC rules as a primary goal of the BEPS project”); Barry Larking, What the World Thinks of Pillar 
2, 98 TAX NOTES INT’L 185, 187 (noting a general consensus implying that existing CFC rules 
cannot combat profit shifting); Sebastian Beer, Ruud de Mooij & Li Liu, International Corporate Tax 
Avoidance: A Review of the Channels, Magnitudes, and Blind Spots 7 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working 
Paper No. 18/168, 2018) (noting the ability of MNEs to avoid residence country CFC rules through 
corporate inversions); Letter from Jeffery M. Kadet, Professor of Law, Univ. of Wash. Sch. of L., to 
the Task Force on the Digit. Econ., Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev. 11 (Oct. 11, 2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3053366 (“It is clear that CFC and transfer 
pricing rules have been ineffective in either curbing MNE enthusiasm for profit shifting or in 
seriously countering its effects.”); Daniel Bunn, Ripple Effects from Controlled Foreign Corporation 
Rules, TAX FOUND. (June 13, 2019), https://taxfoundation.org/controlled-foreign-corporation-rules-
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negligible, and thus F, despite the possibility of encountering Action 5’s 
defensive measures, will shift its income to country j when 
|∆tj| > Πk − Πj. 
As such, residence country defensive measures will not deter firms from 
utilizing favorable tax rulings to avoid tax by shifting income.191 
The Action 5 transparency framework may induce some country 
behavioral changes, although the expected changes are negligible. For 
instance, greater transparency may increase countries’ possible political costs. 
The country cost parameter in the model above primarily consisted of 
political costs. With greater tax ruling transparency, the expected political 
costs are greater than in a scenario where there is no transparency.192 So, 
considering the above model, Action 5 will increase the costs to country j 
from issuing a ruling by some amount ∆cj. As such, country j will issue the 
ruling when 
uj > cj + ∆cj. 
However, widespread tax avoidance activity, let alone isolated instances 
of favorable tax treatment, does not generally elicit any significant directed 
responses from affected jurisdictions.193 Moreover, given that such 
concessions would likely deviate from OECD BEPS Project Actions, 
affording such concessions would violate the country’s commitment to the 
OECD BEPS Project. Generally, violations of international agreements and 
 
effects [https://perma.cc/U45U-U8B2] (explaining how MNEs avoid the CFC rules of various 
jurisdictions by “bunching” subsidiary income in those jurisdictions). 
191 The 1998 Report also authorizes the restriction of participation exemptions, which are the 
primary mechanism by which territorial tax systems exclude foreign income from tax. See OECD, 1998 
REPORT, supra note 7, at 43; POMERLEAU, supra note 52 (noting that before the passage of the TCJA, 
twenty-nine of thirty-five OECD members had participation exemptions). The Code, for example, 
exempts foreign source income by providing a deduction for dividends received from foreign 
corporations. See I.R.C. § 245A(a). However, a participation exemption restriction is even less effective 
than CFC rules. If the United States restricted the application of § 245A as a defensive measure, then 
foreign corporations would forgo paying dividends to their U.S. parents, as this tactic would simply 
defer U.S. tax. And over a long enough period of time, deferral can effectively be complete avoidance. 
As such, participation exemption restrictions cannot effectively combat tax avoidance. 
192 See Neubig, supra note 19, at 1148-49 (observing that exposure of favorable tax rulings has 
caused some jurisdictions to alter their tax laws and practices). 
193 See, e.g., Bowers, supra note 176 (observing that four and a half years following LuxLeaks, 
the Commission had “failed to investigate a single Lux Leaks tax ruling”); Cayman Islands, supra 
note 175 (observing that the E.U. placed the Cayman Islands on the “EU blacklist” for the perceived 
absence of measures to ensure economic substance with respect to the taxation of collective 
investment vehicles but noting that blacklist will have little effect on Cayman Island funds’ ability 
to raise foreign capital). 
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collaborative efforts adversely impact a country’s reputation. But because the 
OECD BEPS Project is soft law, deviations from its terms would not cause 
significant reputational damage.194 As such, the political costs resulting from 
transparency will likely only deter countries from issuing egregiously 
favorable tax rulings. But the prevalence of such rulings is small, if not 
negligible, and a ruling need not be extraordinarily egregious to induce a 
foreign MNE to shift income to that jurisdiction. As such, ∆cj will generally 
be negligible such that it will approximately equal zero. So, if the ruling satisfies 
uj > cj, 
then it too will also satisfy 
uj > cj + ∆cj. 
Therefore, heightened political costs and pressures from issuing violative tax 
rulings in a scenario with transparency are insufficient to deter countries from 
issuing such rulings. 
Moreover, even if increased transparency lessens the secretive nature of 
issued tax rulings, tax rulings are still the ideal method to induce income shifting. 
As mentioned, countries hoping to induce income shifting favor tax rulings, in 
part, because they can be issued more discretely than amending domestic tax 
law.195 Although tax ruling transparency certainly reduces this secrecy, tax 
rulings are nevertheless effective at attracting income shifting because of the 
other advantages that they have over tax law changes.196 In addition, even with 
transparency requirements, tax rulings still remain more discrete than domestic 
tax law changes because Action 5 requires an information exchange with only a 
 
194 See Timothy Meyer, Power, Exit Costs, and Renegotiation in International Law, 51 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 379, 394-95, 397 (2010) (equating exit provisions to soft law agreements, noting that exit 
provisions in international agreements allow for countries to leave such agreements without 
suffering reputational harm, and implying that the distinction between exit and violations of 
agreements is relevant only if there is a desire to renegotiate the existing agreement); see also Andrew 
T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 171, 183-84 (2010) 
(noting that one reason why states may choose soft law because they prefer to lower the costs of 
avoiding their obligations stemming from the agreement under certain conditions). Additionally, it 
appears that inadequate compliance with Action 5 does not result in material reputational costs to 
noncompliant countries as the most recent BEPS Progress Report indicates that thirty-two 
jurisdictions have not yet implemented the OECD’s recommended changes to their exchange 
practices. OECD, 2019–2020 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 18, at 16. Given the extent to which 
the OECD and BEPS Project supporters champion transparency as a highly effective tool to stem 
the use of rulings to afford unwarranted tax concessions, one would expect that, assuming 
reputational costs of noncompliance were material, these countries would have already implemented 
the OECD’s recommendations. 
195 See supra notes 165–67 and accompanying text. 
196 See supra notes 165–66 and accompanying text. 
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limited number of parties.197 Therefore, even when subject to greater tax ruling 
transparency requirements, countries are unlikely to use an alternative 
mechanism to induce foreign MNE income shifting. 
Finally, Action 5’s defensive measures will not affect the supply of tax 
rulings. After F’s residence country takes defensive measures, country j may 
no longer be the optimal location for F to continue to shift its income. If F 
then begins shifting its income elsewhere, country j will not fully realize the 
estimated benefits of F’s income shifting, uj. More specifically, country j will 
not realize some portion α ∈ [0, 1] of these benefits. As the probability of F’s 
residence country taking defensive measures is φ, the ruling’s benefits to 
country j must satisfy 
uj - φαuj > cj, 
which can be simplified to 
(1 - φα)uj > cj.198 
However, to actually reduce the benefits to country j from issuing a 
favorable tax ruling, the defensive measures must deter income shifting. 
Because they do not, defensive measures will not induce F to shift its income 
elsewhere. Therefore, α is approximately zero. So, if the benefits to country j satisfy 
uj > cj, 
then they will also satisfy 
(1 - φα)uj > cj. 
As such, Action 5’s defensive measures will not deter countries from issuing 
violative tax rulings. 
Furthermore, while transparency not only fails to limit the prevalence of 
favorable tax rulings, it may also produce a more perverse consequence. The 
OECD BEPS Project’s transparency framework can make countries that 
compete with each other through taxes to attract foreign investment199 aware of 
one another’s rulings.200 More publicly available rulings better illuminate the 
 
197 See OECD, ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 53 tbl.53. 
198 As with MNEs, this analysis assumes that countries are risk neutral. 
199 OECD, 1998 REPORT, supra note 7, ¶ 27; Faulhaber, supra note 34, at 311. 
200 For general rulings, the OECD suggests that the granting country make the ruling publicly 
available. OECD, ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, ¶ 141. For taxpayer-specific 
rulings, the OECD suggests the issuing country share the ruling with the relevant countries, which 
depends on the type of ruling issued. Id. 
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types rulings that may induce foreign MNEs to shift income. As such, 
transparency can actually uncover opportunities and methods for countries to 
compete for foreign MNE income through tax rulings. Because the transparency 
framework requires countries to exchange the subject matter of the ruling and 
the transaction amount,201 countries can more effectively “bid” for the foreign 
MNE’s income. As a result, transparency can actually turn tax rulings into a 
global auction, increasing the prevalence of favorable tax rulings.202 
B. The Complementarity of Transparency and Disgorgement 
Alone, Action 5’s tax ruling transparency likely elicits negligible or no 
behavioral responses from either MNEs or countries. Coupled with a 
disgorgement mechanism, however, transparency creates significant 
behavioral changes, because their combination frustrates the utility of 
favorable tax rulings. In fact, following the implementation of Action 5 and 
E.U. tax ruling transparency measures, one commentator concluded that 
enhanced transparency would bolster E.U. state aid law enforcement in tax-
related cases.203 The above model can explain these expected effects. 
1. Complementarity and the Magnitude of the Tax Concession 
Transparency and disgorgement together tend to affect firm behavior 
rather than country behavior. In the above model, without transparency or 
the possibility of disgorgement, or with transparency alone, F will shift its 
operations to country j if the tax concession satisfies 
|∆tj| > Πk − Πj. 
However, the possibility that F will be forced to disgorge country j’s offered 
tax concession alters this inequality. By creating the possibility of 
disgorgement, there is some probability p ∈ [0, 1] that F can keep the afforded 
 
201 Id. ¶¶ 130-31 (describing information exchanges); id. annex C at 74-79 (providing template 
forms with which to conduct exchanges). 
202 Cf. Alexandre Mas, Does Disclosure Affect CEO Pay Setting?: Evidence from the Passage of the 
1934 Securities and Exchange Act 1 (Indus. Rels. Section, Princeton Univ., Working Paper No. 632, 
2019), https://dataspace.princeton.edu/handle/88435/dsp010k225d92n (noting that executive 
compensation increased following mandatory public disclosure of compensation even though the 
purpose of disclosure was to serve as a check on the level of compensation). 
203 See William Hoke, Country Digest, Tax Transparency Directive Adds Value, European 
Commission Says, 95 TAX NOTES INT’L 1298, 1298 (2019) (“[T]ougher tax transparency rules are 
adding value for member states . . . .”). 
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concession.204 The probability p is a function of both the magnitude of the tax 
concession, |∆tj|, and the characteristics of the ruling, denoted y, with the 
latter primarily contemplating the degree of the ruling’s deviation from the 
issuing country’s normal tax laws or OECD standards, including the OECD 
BEPS Project Actions.205 With transparency and the possibility of 
disgorgement, the expected value of the tax concession—the magnitude of the 
concession multiplied by the probability F can keep the concession—must be 
greater than the difference in profit from shifting income to country j, rather 
than merely the concession’s magnitude in the scenario where there is no 
disgorgement mechanism. Accordingly, the tax concession must instead 
satisfy 
|∆tj| × p(|∆tj|, y) > Πk − Πj 
to induce F to shift its income to country j.206 
The probability that a firm can keep the afforded tax concession is 
inversely related to the magnitude of the concession. This is because a 
relatively larger tax concession is prima facie more violative of the 
disgorgement mechanism’s substantive guidelines, especially in the context of 
E.U. state aid law and the substantive backdrop of a hypothetical BEPS-
focused disgorgement mechanism. In the E.U. state aid law context, any 
increase in the magnitude of the tax concession is prima facie more 
anticompetitive and thus more likely subject to disgorgement.207 The same is 
expected under a hypothetical BEPS-focused disgorgement mechanism. As 
the magnitude of the tax concession increases, the ruling is more likely to give 
rise to general BEPS concerns because it would be more likely to induce 
artificial profit shifting. This type of income shifting is the primary focus of 
the OECD BEPS Project.208 As a result, a larger tax concession would more 
likely be subject to disgorgement. Therefore, relatively larger tax concessions 
 
204 See, e.g., Allison Christians, Friends with Tax Benefits: Apple’s Cautionary Tale, 78 TAX NOTES 
INT’L 1031, 1034 (2015) (noting that the E.U. state aid case against Ireland “raises the stakes” for 
MNE tax planning as there is reason to doubt that privately arranged deals will survive scrutiny). 
205 The interplay between transparency and the content of the ruling is discussed in infra 
subsection II.B.2. 
206 The remainder of this subsection will only consider the tax concession’s magnitude to 
analyze transparency and disgorgement. Consideration of the content of the ruling is discussed infra 
subsection II.B.2. 
207 As mentioned, E.U. state aid law generally disallows E.U. Member States to grant any 
forms of aid or subsidies that “distort[]” competition among market participants. See TFEU, supra 
note 25, art. 107(1). 
208 See What Is BEPS?, supra note 14 (“Countries now have the tools to ensure that profits are 
taxed where economic activities generating the profits are performed and where value is created.”). 
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are prima facie more violative of the relevant disgorgement mechanism’s 
substantive backdrop. 
The effect of the concession’s magnitude on the probability that an MNE 
can keep the afforded tax concession limits the expected value of the 
concession to some finite number, regardless of its actual value. Because the 
probability that a firm can keep the afforded concession is inversely related 
to the magnitude of the concession, the expected value will be “bounded 
below” some number. That is, there exists some number by which the 
expected value of a given concession afforded by a tax ruling cannot exceed 
as |∆tj| increases from zero to infinity. If this number is less than difference 
in profit between the possible income locations, then F will not shift its 
income regardless of how large |∆tj| is. 
A simple numerical example illustrates this point. Consider p as only a 
function of |∆tj|, or p(|∆tj|). Further, let p(|∆tj|) be defined as 




Accordingly, as |∆tj| increases from 0 to infinity, the probability that F 
can keep the tax concession afforded by the ruling ranges from 1 to 0. The 
magnitude of the tax concession must now be multiplied by p(|∆tj|) to 
determine the expected value of the concession to F. This can be expressed 
as a function, denoted V(|∆tj|) given by 




Similar to p(|∆tj|), V(|∆tj|) ranges from 0 to 1 as |∆tj| increases from 0 to 
infinity. In other words, V(|∆tj|) is bounded below 1. Therefore, 
if Πk − Πj > 1, then V(|∆tj|) < Πk − Πj 
for all tax concessions afforded by a ruling, even if the concession’s dollar 
value is infinite. As such, a tax ruling would not be able to induce F to shift 
its income to country j rather than leaving it in country k. 
This example is generalizable to other instances where p(|∆tj|) is similarly 




where z > 0 although it is likely that 1 > z > 0.209 Accordingly, p(|∆tj|) still 
 
209 The reason z is likely between 0 and 1 is because V(|∆tj|) is bounded below )*. Even with a 
disgorgement mechanism there will likely still remain instances where a tax ruling will be able to 
successfully induce income shifting and in those instances it is highly unlikely that the difference in 
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ranges from 1 to 0 as |∆tj| increases from 0 to infinity, and V(|∆tj|) ranges 
from 0 to 
*
.
 as |∆tj| increases from 0 to infinity. Similar to the previous 
example, V(|∆tj|) is now bounded below *., and a tax ruling cannot induce F 
to shift its income to country j if 
*
.
 < Πk − Πj. 
This theoretical limit on the expected value of any given tax concession, 
however, does not incorporate an additional constraint accounted for by the 
model. Country j will issue a ruling to F only if uj > cj. As mentioned, the 
benefits to country j from issuing the ruling are primarily increased tax 
revenues, as country j can still extract some tax from F despite the afforded 
concession. However, a disgorgement mechanism requires an increase in the 
magnitude of the afforded tax concession to induce income shifting. 
Consequently, the disgorgement mechanism requires a larger outlay by country 
j that reduces country j’s possible benefits from F’s income shifting relative to 
a situation where there is no such mechanism. If the necessary tax concession 
exceeds country j’s net benefits, then country j will not issue a ruling to induce 
income shifting. This constrains the maximum possible tax concession as it 
cannot exceed the net benefits to country j. So, |∆tj| can only range from 0 to 
(uj-cj-𝜀𝜀), where 𝜀𝜀 is some arbitrarily small positive number.210 Because (uj-cj-𝜀𝜀) 
is the maximum possible value of |∆tj|, V(uj-cj-𝜀𝜀) must exceed Πk − Πj for a tax 
ruling to induce income shifting. Therefore, even in instances where 
*
.
 > Πk − Πj, 
if 
Πk − Πj > V(uj-cj-𝜀𝜀), 
then a tax ruling will be unable to induce income shifting. Because the 
possibility of disgorgement requires a larger concession, it is more likely that 
the magnitude of this concession required to induce income shifting will 
exceed (uj-cj-𝜀𝜀) than in a scenario without a disgorgement mechanism. 
Accordingly, disgorgement can frustrate tax ruling-induced income shifting 
 
profit between two possible jurisdictions is 1 or less. Accordingly, z being between 0 and 1 will be 
able to account for such instances. 
210 The inclusion of 𝜀𝜀 ensures that the maximum possible offered tax concession does not 
completely eliminate the net benefits to country j from issuing the ruling. This would render country 
j indifferent to offering the ruling. 
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by effectively inhibiting the satisfaction of the necessary conditions for 
ruling-induced income shifting. 
The above conclusions have not considered the effect of tax ruling 
transparency. Without transparency, the body responsible for seeking 
disgorgement does not as productively identify tax rulings that may violate 
substantive guidelines with which rulings must comply. In the context of E.U. 
state aid, for instance, without disclosure or notification by the issuing 
country, the enforcing body needs to either receive a tip from a third party or 
have suspicion leading to a serendipitous discovery of a violative tax ruling.211 
Tax ruling transparency gives the enforcing body full and immediate access 
to all issued tax rulings. Accordingly, transparency increases the enforcing 
body’s sensitivity to the magnitude of the afforded tax concession relative to 
a situation where there is no transparency. This, in turn, reduces the number 
below which the maximum expected value of a tax concession is bounded. 
Using the generalized example of the expected value function above, 
transparency helps minimize this threshold by affecting the scalar value z. In 




|∆tj| increases from 0 to (uj-cj-𝜀𝜀); in other words, the expected value of the 
tax concession will never exceed 
*
.
. As mentioned, the relevant enforcing 
body’s sensitivity to the size of the tax concession afforded by the ruling 
increases when tax ruling transparency complements the disgorgement 
mechanism. As such, transparency increases the value z to ?̂?𝑧. As such, 
transparency changes the expected value function to 




Accordingly, transparency thus decreases the maximum expected value of 
an infinitely large tax concession afforded by a tax ruling as 
*
.




. Moreover, because the maximum concession cannot exceed (uj-cj-𝜀𝜀) 
regardless of tax ruling transparency, 
V(uj-cj-𝜀𝜀) > 𝑉𝑉. (uj-cj-𝜀𝜀). 
 
211 See Mason, supra note 27, at 455 (explaining the Commission’s investigative procedure when it 
suspects a Member State has granted “so-called unnotified aid”); e.g., Giraud & Petit, supra note 29, at 
233 (observing the Commission’s increased ruling-related state aid investigations following LuxLeaks.) 
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As such, the difference in profit between the two possible income 
locations must be smaller for a tax ruling to induce income shifting. 
Accordingly, as long as there are instances where 
V(uj-cj-𝜀𝜀) > Πk − Πj and 𝑉𝑉.(uj-cj-𝜀𝜀) < Πk − Πj, 
transparency will reduce the number of instances where a tax ruling can 
induce income shifting when complementing a disgorgement mechanism. 
As mentioned, the above examples provide only one conception about 
what the function p(|∆tj|) could be. But the true probability function need 
not take the exact form in the provided examples to stem tax ruling-induced 
income shifting. Because the probability that an MNE can keep the tax 
concession afforded by a ruling decreases as the magnitude of the ruling 
increases, the expected value of the concession will always be bounded below 
some number. As long as this number is less than the difference in pre-ruling 
profit between two locations, a ruling will not induce income shifting. As 
such, transparency coupled with a disgorgement mechanism produces a set of 
instances where tax rulings are no longer an effective means to induce income 
shifting, and it can be expected that transparency will reduce the number of 
instances where rulings can induce income shifting. 
2. Complementarity and the Content of the Tax Ruling 
Thus far, the discussion has analyzed the impact of tax ruling transparency 
on a disgorgement mechanism considering only the magnitude of the tax 
concession afforded. However, as previously stated, the probability that a firm 
can keep the afforded tax concession is not only a function of the concession’s 
monetary value but also the subject matter of the ruling itself. In other words, 
how the ruling decreases an MNE’s tax liability also influences this probability. 
The content of a ruling influences the probability that an MNE can keep 
a tax concession afforded by a ruling. Consider the following example. 
Suppose a non-U.S. MNE, F. Corp., wants to shift interest income to the 
United States to avoid current taxation on this income in its home country. To 
do so, suppose F. Corp. incorporates a subsidiary in the United States, U.S. 
Sub. F. Corp. contributes cash to U.S. Sub upon its incorporation, and U.S. 
Sub proceeds to open a bank account in the U.S. and deposit the cash in the 
account. Suppose further that F. Corp. shifted this interest income because 
the IRS issued a ruling simply providing that the interest income received by 
U.S. Sub is not subject to U.S. tax. Such a ruling would significantly deviate 
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from clearly defined U.S. tax law.212 Accordingly, if this ruling were subject to 
disgorgement and U.S. tax law was part of the disgorgement mechanism’s 
substantive backdrop for this particular case, the probability that F. Corp. and 
U.S. Sub can keep the tax concession would certainly be very low, regardless 
of the size of the concession. 
As such, the content of the ruling warrants consideration when determining 
the probability that a firm can keep an afforded concession. Considering the 
generalized example of a probability function in the previous subsection, the 
content of the ruling imposes a new variable y, which can be considered a 
function itself whose value is determined by the content of the ruling at issue 
and whose value affects the probability that an MNE can keep the afforded tax 
concession. As such, this probability is now expressed in its entirety as 




This probability ranges from 1 to 0 as |∆tj| ranges from 0 to infinity. 
Accordingly, the expected value of a tax concession afforded by a ruling is 




Now, instead of V(|∆tj|, y) ranging from 0 to *. as |∆tj| ranges from 0 to 
infinity, V(|∆tj|, y) ranges from 0 to *0.. Accordingly, the value y has 
significant importance for determining the theoretical maximum expected 
value of a tax concession and thus whether tax rulings can induce income 
shifting, regardless of the magnitude of the afforded concession and relevant 
enforcement body’s sensitivity to this magnitude. 
The content of the ruling’s effect on the probability that an MNE can keep 
an afforded tax concession depends on the extent to which the ruling 
identifiably deviates from the applicable rules underlying the disgorgement 
mechanism. This in turn depends on how well-defined these rules are. If the 
 
212 See I.R.C. § 61(a)(4) (“[G]ross income . . . includ[es] . . . [i]nterest . . . .”); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-
7(a) (as amended in 1966) (“As a general rule, interest received by or credited to the taxpayer constitutes 
gross income and is fully taxable. Interest income includes interest on . . . bank deposits . . . .”). 
213 It is important to distinguish between the two scalar values in this function. The values z 
and ?̂?𝑧 capture the relevant enforcing body’s sensitivity to the magnitude of the tax concession. The 
two values z and ?̂?𝑧 are exhaustive of what this scalar value can be, as z applies when there is no tax 
ruling transparency and ?̂?𝑧 applies when there is tax ruling transparency, such as in a hypothetical 
BEPS-focused disgorgement mechanism incorporating Action 5. The value y, while implicitly 
serving as a scalar value, can be considered a function of the content of the ruling by which the 
content imputes some numerical value for y. Accordingly, y depends on the particular tax ruling at 
issue and theoretically has infinite possible values. 
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applicable tax rules are vague and the ruling deviates only slightly, the value y 
will be relatively small. Because in the absence of transparency the maximum 
value of V(|∆tj|, y) is *0. (ignoring the constraint on the magnitude of the tax 
concession of (uj-cj-𝜀𝜀)), a relatively small value y imputes a relatively large 
maximum value of V(|∆tj|, y). This would necessarily lead to more instances 
where a tax ruling can induce income shifting. Conversely, if the disgorgement 
mechanism has more well-defined rules, even minor deviations would impute 
a relatively high value of y. Considering the example of F. Corp. and U.S. Sub, 
if the ruling more subtly immunized the interest income from tax by, for 
example, recasting the interest as some other item of income excluded from 
“gross income” under I.R.C. § 61, the deviation from the applicable U.S. tax 
law would be less extreme relative to the original example. However, such a 
ruling would still violate U.S. tax law because the transaction between the bank 
and U.S. Sub can only be properly characterized as a payment of interest on a 
bank deposit. And if U.S. tax law served as part of the disgorgement 
mechanism’s substantive backdrop in that case, even this subtler deviation 
would impute a relatively large value of y and, as such, a relatively low 
maximum value of V(|∆tj|, y). Accordingly, the more well-defined the 
substantive rules undergirding the relevant disgorgement mechanism, the 
more identifiable a ruling’s deviations from these rules and the less likely that 
ruling can be used to induce income shifting. 
Transparency essentially compounds the ruling content’s effect on the 
probability that an MNE can keep an afforded concession. In general, tax 
ruling transparency provides the relevant enforcing body with all issued 
rulings that meet the exchange requirements. In the OECD BEPS Project 
context, Action 5 requires this exchange of tax rulings, as well as information 
such as the type of ruling issued214 and a short summary of the issue covered 
by the ruling.215 Action 5 also recommends exchanging additional information 
including the value of the transaction at issue in the ruling and the recipient 
entity’s profit.216 Similar to the effect transparency has with respect to the 
magnitude of the afforded concession, greater transparency pertaining to the 
content of the ruling effectively grants the relevant enforcement body greater 
access to issued rulings and allows them to more effectively scrutinize rulings’ 
 
214 In other words, the issuing country must identify which of the six categories of rulings 
subject to exchange the issued ruling corresponds to. 
215 See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
216 OECD, ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, annex C at 75-76. 
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content. Accordingly, the enforcement body’s sensitivity to rulings’ content 
increases and each issued ruling is prima facie less likely to withstand this 
body’s examination. 
Transparency’s effect on the enforcement body’s sensitivity to rulings’ 
content decreases the expected value of any given tax concession. In the 
presence of transparency, the value y for the particular ruling increases to 𝑦𝑦0 
such that y > 𝑦𝑦0. Accordingly, the expected value function in the presence of 
transparency must incorporate this effect on the value y, and therefore this 
function can be expressed as 




This function is therefore bounded below 
*
01.̂
 as |∆tj| ranges from 0 to infinity. 
Moreover, transparency reduces the expected value of the maximum 
concession that can be afforded as 
V((uj-cj-𝜀𝜀), y) > 𝑉𝑉. ((uj-cj-𝜀𝜀), 𝑦𝑦0), 
notwithstanding transparency’s effect on the relevant enforcing body’s 
sensitivity to the magnitude of the afforded concession. Similar to 
transparency’s effect on the sensitivity to the magnitude of the afforded 
concession, its effect with respect to the content of the ruling thus necessitates 
a smaller difference in profit between two locations to induce income shifting. 
As such, as long as there are instances where 
V((uj-cj-𝜀𝜀), y) > Πk − Πj 
and 
𝑉𝑉. ((uj-cj-𝜀𝜀), 𝑦𝑦0) < Πk − Πj, 
transparency’s effect with respect to the content of rulings will reduce the 
number of instances where rulings can induce income shifting. 
Even if the true probability function does not take the same form 
expressed throughout this Section, in the context of a hypothetical BEPS-
focused disgorgement mechanism, the introduction of a transparency 
framework comparable to Action 5’s will reduce the number of instances where 
a tax ruling can induce income shifting. Whatever the true probability 
function’s construct, transparency’s effect with respect to the content of the 
ruling will produce the same result because the content of the ruling affects 
whether a ruling can stand after examination. Without enhanced disclosure, it 
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is more difficult to uncover the existence of rulings and easier for countries to 
issue vague rulings that can both induce income shifting and avoid detection 
by the disgorgement mechanism’s enforcement body. With enhanced 
disclosure, it becomes easier to both discover the existence of issued rulings 
and compare the rulings’ subject matter with the relevant substantive backdrop 
of the disgorgement mechanism. This results in more effective identification 
of those rulings whose characteristics violate this backdrop and lead to BEPS 
issues. Therefore, enhanced disclosure of ruling content will also help to 
decrease the efficacy of using rulings to induce income shifting and serves as 
another means by which tax ruling transparency complements disgorgement. 
III. IMPLEMENTING A BEPS-FOCUSED DISGORGEMENT 
MECHANISM 
The preceding section demonstrated the theoretical ineffectiveness of 
transparency alone and the theoretical effectiveness of pairing transparency 
and a disgorgement mechanism. To effectuate the expected behavioral changes 
of the OECD BEPS Project and in particular Action 5’s transparency 
framework, a BEPS-focused disgorgement mechanism should be 
implemented. Adhering to this proposal is realistic because a similar 
mechanism exists to enforce E.U. state aid law.217 Although E.U. state aid law’s 
procedural aspects are advantageous, its substantive aspects are not well suited 
to handle the issues contemplated by the OECD BEPS Project because tax 
ruling-induced income shifting arguably complies with state aid law. The 
proposed disgorgement mechanism, while procedurally analogous to E.U. 
state aid law enforcement, will use the issuing country’s tax laws and the 
substantive guidelines of the OECD BEPS Project and other OECD 
guidance to reduce the prevalence of tax ruling-induced income shifting. 
A. An Analysis of E.U. State Aid Law 
In general, E.U. state aid law deals with competition among E.U. Member 
States. State aid law effectively limits the extent to which Member States can 
subsidize business218 to prevent the distortion of competition within the E.U. 
internal market.219 Although state aid law initially aimed to prevent 
 
217 See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text. 
218 Mason, supra note 27, at 451. 
219 Ana Pošćić, Procedural Aspects of EU State Aid Law, in PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF EU LAW 
490, 490 (Dunja Duić & Tunjica Petrašević eds., 2017) (“In EU law, any aid, which distorts or 
threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain 
goods, is prohibited, as far as it affects trade between Member States.”). 
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protectionism, it now covers harmful tax competition practices, including 
inappropriate uses of tax rulings.220 
1. Substantive State Aid Law and Its Application to Tax Rulings 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) describes 
state aid as “any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in 
any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by 
favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods.”221 
Although the TFEU states that such state aid “shall, in so far as it affects 
trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market,” it 
does not prohibit all subsidies provided by Member States.222 Some measures 
are explicitly deemed compatible with the internal market223 while others are 
considered potentially compatible.224 The European Commission is the body 
responsible for enforcing state aid law and challenging aid’s compatibility 
with the internal market.225 
The European Commission and E.U. courts use a four-element test to 
determine whether a governmental measure constitutes state aid.226 First, the 
measure must be a state intervention or a use of state resources.227 Second, 
the measure must be liable to affect trade between Member States.228 Third, 
the measure must provide a “selective advantage” to the recipient.229 Finally, 
the measure must “distort or threaten to distort competition.”230 
The third element, selective advantage, is generally subdivided into its 
component parts: selectivity and advantage. A measure is selective when 
directed at specific undertakings or types of goods.231 Selectivity can be either 
de jure or de facto depending upon how the Member State grants the 
measure.232 A measure provides an advantage when it bestows an economic 
 
220 See Commission Notice on State Aid, supra note 26, ¶ 170 (noting that tax rulings must conform 
to state-aid law to avoid “confer[ring] a selective advantage”); accord Mason, supra note 27, at 452. 
221 TFEU, supra note 25, art. 107(1). 
222 Id. 
223 See id. art. 107(2) (outlining categories of state aid deemed “compatible with the internal 
market,” such as aid to rectify damage from natural disasters). 
224 See id. art. 107(3) (outlining categories of state aid which “may be considered to be compatible 
with the internal market,” such as aid to promote economic development in poorer regions). 
225 TFEU, supra note 25, art. 108(1). 
226 See Case T-760/15, Kingdom of the Neth. v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:T:2019:669, ¶ 127 (Sept. 24, 





231 Pošćić, supra note 219, at 490. 
232 See Commission Notice on State Aid, supra note 26, ¶¶ 121-22. 
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benefit only available through state intervention in an undertaking.233 The 
European Commission generally uses the “market economy operator” test to 
identify an advantage.234 Under this test, a Member State confers an 
advantage when it has not “acted as a market economy operator would have 
done in a similar situation.”235 In other words, the test asks whether a private 
investor could have been induced to make the same investment as the 
Member State.236 
Tax rulings are regulated by state aid law, but they are not prima facie 
violative of it.237 Disagreements over the subject matter of tax rulings do 
occur between the European Commission and Member States, however, and 
disputes usually focus on selectivity and advantage.238 According to the 
European Commission, a tax ruling may confer an advantage when it 
decreases the ruling recipient’s tax liability below the level that would result 
from an ordinary application of the Member State’s tax laws.239 As a result, 
the Commission often uses the Member State’s regularly applied tax regime 
as the baseline for determining the existence of an advantage.240 Some have 
noted that once the European Commission finds a tax ruling confers an 
advantage, a finding of selectivity naturally follows.241 
 
233 See id. ¶ 74. 
234 Id. ¶ 75 (emphasis omitted). 
235 Id. ¶ 76. 
236 See id. ¶ 74; accord Mason, supra note 27, at 452. 
237 See Commission Notice on State Aid, supra note 26, ¶ 169 (noting that Member States can 
provide “legal certainty and predictability” to their taxpayers through tax rulings). 
238 See, e.g., Case T-760/15, Kingdom of the Neth. v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:T:2019:669, ¶ 128 
(Sept. 24, 2019) (“[T]he Netherlands and Starbucks do not dispute the assessment made by the 
Commission regarding [the first, second and fourth elements of the state aid analysis] . . . . The[ir] 
first four pleas . . . seek, in essence, to call into question the Commission’s finding that [the 
challenged tax ruling] conferred a selective advantage . . . .”); see also Mason, supra note 27, at 452 
(“Under the current state of development of EU law, tax subsidies easily satisfy all the elements [of 
state aid] except for advantage and selectivity . . . .”); accord Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis, The 
Cracks in the European Commission’s Apple Case, 154 TAX NOTES 55, 60-61 (2017) (noting that “[i]n 
most tax cases, the sole question is selectivity” and although a Member State’s tax rulings are not 
per se selective, “[tax] rulings are the primary mechanism to grant advantageous deals to taxpayers”); 
Kyle Richard, Are All Tax Rulings State Aid? Examining the European Commission’s Recent State Aid 
Decisions, 18 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 1, 15-16 (2018) (noting that, in state aid cases challenging 
Member State tax rulings, advantage and selectivity are the only elements in dispute). 
239 See Commission Notice on State Aid, supra note 26, ¶ 170. 
240 Mason, supra note 27, at 453. In addition, the Commission has recently embraced the “arm’s 
length” standard to determine whether a tax ruling provides an advantage. See Richard, supra note 
238, at 16; see also Ruth Mason, Special Report, Tax Rulings as State Aid – Part 4: Whose Arm’s-Length 
Standard?, 155 TAX NOTES 947, 951 (2017) (describing the use of an arm’s length standard in recent 
tax ruling state aid cases involving transfer pricing and profit allocation). The arm’s length standard 
is a recent development in state aid law, and its use has garnered significant criticism. See id. at 951, 
963 (noting the Treasury’s claims that the arm’s length standard undermines the BEPS Project). 
241 See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S RECENT STATE AID 
INVESTIGATIONS OF TRANSFER PRICING RULES 8 (2016) (noting that in the recent significant state 
 
1596 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 169: 1545 
In recent years, the European Commission has increased the number of 
state aid cases concerning tax rulings.242 Some high-profile cases involved 
MNEs such as Apple, Starbucks, and Fiat.243 In the Apple state aid case, 
involving the rulings described earlier,244 the European Commission initially 
ordered Ireland to recover approximately €13 billion in “undue” tax 
benefits,245 but the European Union General Court (GCEU) ultimately 
decided the appeal in favor of Apple and Ireland.246 The Starbucks state aid 
case involved an APA issued by the Netherlands, which Starbucks won on 
appeal.247 The Fiat state aid case, however, involved a Luxembourg ruling 
approving a level of payment for services rendered to it and the European 
Commission won its case on appeal.248 
2. The Procedural Aspects of State Aid Law Enforcement 
Generally, the preliminary procedural steps for state aid cases depend on 
the type of aid involved. For “notified aid”—aid that Member States plan to 
grant—Article 108 of the TFEU requires all Member States to notify the 
European Commission.249 Notification of plans to grant aid triggers a 
preliminary investigation, but the Commission can also approve the Member 
State’s plans after applying the “simplified procedure.”250 After the 
preliminary investigation, the Commission either decides that there is no aid 
within the meaning of E.U. rules, that the aid is compatible with the internal 
 
aid cases involving tax rulings, once the Commission found the rulings provided an advantage 
because they deviated from the “arm’s length principle,” a finding of selectivity followed). Ruth 
Mason distinguishes between tax rulings as individual aid and general aid and notes that once 
advantage is demonstrated in individual aid cases, a showing that the ruling did not benefit all 
comparable taxpayers is sufficient to demonstrate selectivity. Ruth Mason, Special Report on State Aid 
– Part 3: Apple, 154 TAX NOTES 735, 745-46 (2017). Mason further explains that in instances of tax 
rulings as general aid, once advantage is shown, the aid’s failure to benefit comparable firms 
demonstrates selectivity. Id. 
242 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 216, at 2. 
243 Id. 
244 See supra notes 57–78 and accompanying text. 
245 Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, supra note 13, at 3. 
246 Case T-892/16, Apple Sales Int’l v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:T:2020:338, ¶ 507 (July 15, 2020). 
247 See Case T-760/15, Kingdom of the Neth. v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:T:2019:669, ¶ 561 (Sept. 
24, 2019) (joined with Case T-636/16, Starbucks Corp. v. Comm’n). 
248 See Case T-755/15, Grand Duchy of Lux. v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:T:2019:670, ¶ 430 (Sept. 
24, 2019) (joined with Case T-759/15, Fiat Chrysler Fin. Eur. v. Comm’n). 
249 TFEU, supra note 25, art. 108(3). There are three exceptions, including a de minimis 
exception, to the general requirement to notify the Commission of plans to grant aid. Pošćić, supra 
note 219, at 494. 
250 Id. The simplified procedure applies to instances where the Commission must only “verify 
that the aid complies with “the existing rules and practice.” Id. at 495-96. 
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market, or that “serious doubts” remain as to the aid’s compatibility with the 
internal market.251 
The other types of aid at the initial investigatory phase are misused aid, 
existing aid, and unlawful aid. Misused aid is previously authorized aid252 that 
the Member State subsequently uses in contravention to a Commission 
decision.253 Existing aid is previously authorized aid that may no longer be 
compatible with the internal market.254 Unlawful aid is aid granted without 
prior Commission authorization, whether or not such aid is incompatible with 
the internal market.255 The Commission may initiate a preliminary 
investigation into existing aid256 but must initiate a preliminary investigation 
into unlawful aid.257 Misused aid requires a formal investigation procedure, 
described below.258 
Following preliminary investigations, the Commission can initiate the 
formal investigation procedure into every kind of state aid.259 Although the 
Commission must initiate the formal investigation procedure for misused aid, a 
formal investigation into notified and unlawful aid will occur where the 
Commission seriously doubts that the aid is compatible with the internal 
market.260 The Commission will initiate the formal investigation procedure into 
existing aid if the Member State does not accept the Commission’s proposed 
measures to render the existing aid compatible with the internal market.261 
Following the formal investigation procedure, the Commission renders a 
decision with three possible outcomes.262 The Commission issues a positive 
decision upon determining that there is no aid within the meaning of E.U. 
law or that the aid is compatible with the internal market.263 The second type 
of decision, a conditional decision, is issued where the Commission finds the 
 
251 EUR. COMM’N, supra note 27, at 1  (emphasis omitted); Pošćić, supra note 219, at 495. 
252 Id. at 1-2. 
253 Pošćić, supra note 219, at 499. 
254 EUR. COMM’N, supra note 27, at 1-2. 
255 Id. at 2. 
256 Id. at 1-2 (suggesting precursory steps the Commission must take before beginning a 
preliminary investigation procedure if the Commission wants to abolish or adapt an existing aid 
scheme); Pošćić, supra note 219, at 494 (“The Member States have to notify the Commission with 
plans to grant new or alter existing aid. However, the Commission has investigative powers and can 
act upon the complaint of any interested party or on its own initiative.” (emphasis added)). 
257 EUR. COMM’N, supra note 27, at 2. 
258 See TFEU, supra note 25, art. 108(2)-(3); see also EUR. COMM’N, supra note 27, at 1. 
259 EUR. COMM’N, supra note 27, at 1-2 (explaining that the Commission can open the formal 
investigation procedure when it finds authorized aid is being misused and must open such procedure 
after the Commission exhausts other investigatory steps). If the Commission seriously doubts that the 
aid is compatible with E.U. state aid law, it must initiate the formal investigation procedure. Id. at 1. 
260 Id. at 1. 
261 Id. at 2. 
262 Id. 
263 Id. 
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state measure is compatible with the internal market, but its implementation 
is subject to one or more conditions.264 The Commission issues the third type 
of decision, a negative decision, where the Commission finds the state 
measure is incompatible with the internal market and, as a result, prohibits 
its implementation.265 If the Member State has already implemented the 
measure, then it must recover the aid plus interest.266 
The Member State and the aid recipient can appeal the Commission’s 
negative decision.267 The GCEU hears first appeals, and the Court of Justice 
of the European Union hears appeals from the GCEU.268 The courts are 
extremely deferential to the Commission’s economic assessments and 
primarily inquire into whether the Commission’s conclusions are sufficiently 
reasoned, the material facts are accurate, and the Commission complied with 
the procedural rules.269 If the E.U. courts uphold the Commission’s negative 
decision, some issues, such as the precise amount of aid recoverable, can still 
be litigated in the Member State’s courts.270 
B. The Structure of a BEPS-Focused Disgorgement Mechanism 
The previous discussion outlined the substantive and procedural aspects 
of E.U. state aid law and will be helpful in understanding the similar structure 
of the proposed BEPS-focused disgorgement mechanism. The two should 
look procedurally similar, but substantively different because state aid law is 
not adequately equipped to handle BEPS issues. 
1. The Inadequacy of State Aid Law to Combat BEPS Issues 
E.U. state aid law is an imperfect body of law in the BEPS context. There 
may be some overlap between state aid and the subject matter of tax rulings of 
which the OECD BEPS Project’s Action 5 mandates exchange. For example, 
some commentators have suggested that state aid can sufficiently cover rulings 
 
264 Id.; see also Pošćić, supra note 219, at 497 (“The Commission may attach to a positive decision 
conditions and may lay down obligations to allow compliance with the decision (‘conditional decision’)”.). 
265 EUR. COMM’N, supra note 27, at 2. 
266 Id. An exception exists when such a recovery would be “contrary to a general principle of 
EU law.” Id. 
267 See id. (“All decisions and procedural conduct of the Commission are subject to review by 
the General Court and ultimately by the ECJ.”). If the Commission renders a positive decision, the 
aid recipient’s competitors can appeal the Commission decision. See Mason, supra note 240, at 948. 
268 EUR. COMM’N, supra note 27, at 2. 
269 Mason, supra note 240, at 948 & n.13 (citing Case T-35/99, Keller SpA v. Comm’n, 
ECLI:EU:T:2002:19, ¶ 77 (Jan. 30, 2002)). 
270 Id. at 949. 
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pertaining to harmful preferential tax regimes,271 as state aid covers income 
from a larger set of activities than that of harmful preferential regimes.272 But 
in general, state aid law would not encompass all tax rulings that deviate from 
the OECD BEPS Project Actions and OECD standards, which the BEPS-
focused disgorgement mechanism would necessarily regulate. 
State aid cannot adequately combat BEPS issues because tax rulings 
arguably do not provide a benefit through state resources.273 As mentioned 
above, a finding of violative aid requires, in part, a finding that the Member 
State used state resources to grant the contested measure.274 In tax-related 
state aid cases, GCEU and Commission decisions find that reducing the aid 
recipient’s tax liability below the amount that would seemingly result from a 
normal application of the Member State’s tax laws constitutes a use of state 
resources.275 In negative decisions, the Commission typically offers little 
more than conclusory language that the Member State would have raised 
more tax revenue had it not issued the contested ruling. For example, in a 
state aid decision involving a tax ruling granted by Luxembourg to the French 
company Engie, the Commission noted “the tax treatment granted on the 
basis of the contested tax rulings can be said to reduce the corporate income 
tax liability in Luxembourg of the Engie group and therefore gives rise to a 
loss of State resources.”276 Importantly, as two commentators note, the 
comparison between the tax revenue the Member State raised and the tax 
revenue that it would have raised if there was no ruling implicitly 
 
271 See, e.g., Faulhaber, supra note 34, at 338 (“[T]he state aid prohibition continues to define 
harmful tax competition more broadly than the FHTP . . . .”). 
272 Compare OECD, ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 19 (“To be [a harmful 
preferential regime], the regime must, firstly, apply to income from geographically mobile activities, 
such as financial and other service activities . . . .” (emphasis added)), with TFEU, supra note 25, art. 
107(1) (defining state aid, in part, as “any aid . . . favouring certain undertakings or the production 
of certain goods”); see also Faulhaber, supra note 34, at 331-32 (noting that the state prohibits “using 
essentially any tax tool . . . designed to attract everything from revenue and legal ownership to the 
location of corporate headquarters and even employment and other activities”). 
273 The actual resolution of some recent tax ruling-related state aid cases also produces doubt as to 
state aid law’s effectiveness in this area. See, e.g., Case T-892/16, Apple Sales Int’l v. Comm’n, 
ECLI:EU:T:2020:338, ¶ 507 (July 15, 2020) (finding that tax authorities had not granted a selective 
advantage by issuing tax rulings); Case T-636/16, Starbucks Corp.v. Comm’, ECLI:EU:T:2019:669, ¶ 561 
(Sept. 24, 2019) (finding that the Commission failed to show a selective advantage). 
274 See supra notes 226–30 and accompanying text. 
275 See, e.g., Case C-387/92, Banco Exterior de España SA v. Ayuntamiento de Valenica, 
ECLI:EU:C:1994:100, ¶¶ 13-14 (“[T]he concept of aid . . . embraces . . . interventions which, in 
various forms, mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking 
. . . . It follows that a measure by which the public authorities grant to certain undertakings a tax 
exemption . . . constitutes State aid . . . .”). 
276 Commission Decision 2019/421 of 20 June 2018 on State Aid SA.44888 (2016/C) (ex 
2016/NN) Implemented by Luxembourg in Favour of ENGIE, 2019 (L 78) 1, 28 ¶ 157; Giraud & 
Petit, supra note 29, at 235 & n.14 (collecting and analyzing Commission decisions). 
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contemplates the following counterfactual: what would the ruling recipient’s 
tax liability have been had the Member State not issued the ruling?277 
If indeed finding that a measure uses state resources implicitly involves 
this counterfactual, then the Commission’s negative decisions are misguided. 
In finding that a selective advantage in tax ruling cases necessarily entails the 
use of state resources,278 the Commission effectively compares the ruling 
recipient’s tax liability to what it would have been absent the ruling holding 
everything else constant. However, the proper application of the counterfactual 
should account for all the behavioral implications had the country not issued 
a ruling, rather than artificially limiting the contemplated changes to the tax 
revenue raised. Specifically, the Commission and E.U. courts should 
determine whether the recipient of the contested aid would have actually 
shifted its income if the country at issue had not issued the ruling. 
In many cases, considering the full range of behavioral implications for 
the absence of a ruling supports the proposition that the ruling never truly 
involved a use of state resources.279 As demonstrated, rulings are often the 
only means by which a country can induce an MNE to shift its income to the 
issuing country. In such cases, absent a ruling, the MNE would not have 
shifted its income to the country in question.280 Without the income shifting, 
the country in question would not have raised any tax revenue. With the 
income shifting, the country at issue does raise tax revenue. Therefore, the 
ruling actually increases the Member State’s revenues, directly contradicting 
the conclusion that the ruling constituted a use of state resources. Thus, state 
 
277 See Giraud & Petit, supra note 29, at 236 (“Here, the Commission proposes to verify 
whether, in the case at hand, the level of taxes raised by the concerned Member State was lower than 
it would have otherwise been absent the measure.”). 
278 See id. at 235-36 (concluding that when determining the use of state resources, “the 
Commission refers to the section of its decision dedicated to the selective advantage, thus suggesting 
that the existence of an advantage necessarily entails the use of State resources”); see, e.g., id. at 235 
n.14; Commission Decision 2019/421, supra note 276, at 28-29 ¶¶ 153-162 (implying a deviation from 
the normal tax system is sufficient for a finding of both selective advantage and the use of state 
resources); Commission Decision 2017/1283, supra note 13, at 53-54 ¶¶ 157-62 (using a deviation from 
Ireland’s normal tax system as support for a finding of both selective advantage and the use of state 
resources); Commission Decision 2016/2326 of 21 Oct. 2015 on State Aid SA.38375 (2014/C ex 
2014/NN) Which Luxembourg Granted to Fiat, 2016 O.J. (L 351) 1, 34 ¶ 188-90 (noting that because 
the ruling at issue reduced the Fiat group’s lower tax liability below the level mandated by the 
Luxembourg tax system, Luxembourg provided both a selective advantage and used state resources); 
Commission Decision 2017/502 of 21 Oct. 2015 on State Aid SA/38374 (2014/C ex 2014/NN) 
Implemented by the Netherlands to Starbucks, 2017 O.J. (L 83) 38 ¶¶ 225-28, 78-79 (justifying a 
finding of both selective advantage and the use of state resources because a tax ruling enabled the 
recipient to pay less tax than a normal application of the Netherland’s tax system would impose). 
279 In some cases, at best, it is ambiguous whether the ruling involved the use of state resources. 
See Giraud & Petit, supra note 29, at 236 (“[T]he Commission takes for granted that, absent the 
ruling, the revenues of the beneficiary in question would have been the same.”). 
280 See id. (“[S]ince the beneficiary had the possibility to locate its revenues elsewhere, it would 
probably have done so absent a ruling on satisfactory terms.”). 
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aid law is not only inadequate to handle tax rulings that offer small tax 
concessions, but it cannot even combat the most egregious tax ruling uses 
because such rulings are prima facie more indicative that the ruling was 
necessary to induce the MNE’s income shifting. Therefore, violative tax 
rulings, insofar as they violate OECD guidelines and give rise to BEPS 
concerns, do not violate state aid law, and, as such, state aid law cannot 
adequately combat the use of rulings to induce income shifting. 
2. The Specifics 
Because substantive state aid law cannot adequately address BEPS issues, 
it cannot provide the substantive backdrop to a BEPS-focused disgorgement 
mechanism. Rather, the substantive backdrop of the mechanism should be 
derived from three sources: OECD BEPS Project Actions, other OECD 
guidance, and the substantive tax law of the country at issue. Generally, other 
Actions and OECD work, such as the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines,281 
address the various subject matter underlying tax rulings within Action 5’s 
scope.282 As such, the OECD has already effectively established the 
substantive guidelines for a BEPS-focused disgorgement mechanism through 
its minimum standards and best practices pertaining to the subject matter of 
rulings within Action 5’s scope. These standards are the ideal source of 
substantive standards for the proposed disgorgement mechanism because 
their purpose is to counter BEPS issues, and a finding that ruling subject 
matter violates them does not involve the challenges associated with findings 
of state aid law violations. 
Notwithstanding the benefits of the OECD BEPS Project’s Actions and 
other OECD guidance, the substantive backdrop should also include, to the 
extent consistent with such Actions and other guidance, the issuing country’s 
tax laws. Rulings that do not comply with an issuing country’s tax laws can 
induce artificial income shifting. Moreover, the OECD readily admits that 
notwithstanding the OECD BEPS Project Actions, there is still significant 
 
281 See OECD, OECD TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL 
ENTERPRISES AND TAX ADMINISTRATIONS (2017), for more information on the OECD’s Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines. 
282 Action 5 subjects six types of rulings to exchange. Action 5 provides the standards for 
preferential regimes and the FHTP’s authority to identify rulings that could give rise to BEPS 
issues. See generally OECD, ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, ¶ 91. The OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines set standards for APAs. See id. ¶¶ 99-100 (using the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines to explain APAs in the context of Action 5’s transparency framework). Action 7 
provides permanent establishment standards. See generally OECD, ACTION 7 – 2015 FINAL REPORT, 
supra note 134, at 9. However, related party conduit rulings and rulings related to downward 
adjustments of taxable profits are not contemplated by any specific Action item, but rather implicitly 
can give rise to BEPS issues as both types of rulings can induce income shifting. 
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artificial income shifting that occurs.283 As such, it is possible that the issuing 
country’s tax laws may address issues that the OECD BEPS Project’s Actions 
and other OECD guidance do not adequately deal with. In this way, the 
issuing country’s tax laws may act as a second layer of defense against ruling-
induced artificial income shifting. Additionally, countries should generally 
apply their tax laws, like all other types of law, consistently.284 This 
substantive background would ensure consistent application of tax law even 
if a ruling deviates from the issuing country’s tax laws but does not conflict 
with the different Actions or other OECD guidance. 
The procedural and other non-substantive aspects of the disgorgement 
mechanism should mirror those of E.U. state aid law. To that end, the BEPS-
focused disgorgement mechanism first needs an enforcement arm analogous 
to the European Commission. The FHTP is well positioned to assume this 
role. Action 5 specifically tasks the FHTP with annually reviewing the 
spontaneous exchange of tax rulings mandated by the OECD BEPS 
Project.285 Specifically, the FHTP analyzes the effectiveness of participating 
countries’ exchanges and the scope of the rulings covered.286 In addition, tax 
rulings subject to Action 5’s mandated exchange include those that the FHTP 
itself determines could give rise to BEPS issues if there were no exchange.287 
The FHTP must therefore necessarily be attuned to identifying and 
addressing ruling practices that implicate the very motivation of the OECD 
BEPS Project: preventing artificial income shifting and tax avoidance. 
Therefore, the FHTP has the requisite expertise to assess rulings and identify 
those that violate the underlying substantive subject matter that subjects the 
ruling to Action 5’s transparency framework. 
In addition to an enforcement arm, there also needs to be an analog to the 
GCEU for appellate purposes. The mutual agreement procedure (MAP) is a 
possible body that can be tasked with hearing appeals of FHTP decisions. 
MAP is the primary mechanism by which countries can resolve disputes 
about the proper interpretation and application of the provisions in tax 
treaties between them.288 Action 14 bolstered MAP by providing for more 
 
283 See Fresh Insights, supra note 21 (providing data on profit shifting and noting the continued 
prevalence of BEPS strategies); see also Finley, supra note 21, at 268 (stating that the data suggest 
that the OECD BEPS Project has not yet achieved its goal). 
284 See generally LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 59-60 (rev. ed. 1964) (discussing 
the just application of tax laws); see also Yoav Dotan, Making Consistency Consistent, 57 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 995, 1001 (2005) (“Consistency is undoubtedly a concept of paramount importance within any 
legal system.”). 
285 OECD, ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, ¶ 153. 
286 Id. 
287 Id. ¶ 91. 
288 See OECD, MAKING DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS MORE EFFECTIVE: ACTION 
14 – 2015 FINAL REPORT 9 (2015) (explaining the importance of the mutual agreement procedure). 
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efficient and consistent decisionmaking.289 Also, some countries have 
committed to treating MAP decisions as binding on them.290 
However, because MAP primarily handles tax treaty disputes, it may not 
be adequately equipped to handle all the BEPS issues associated with tax 
rulings. Tax treaty discrepancies, especially as they pertain to residence and 
PE criteria, facilitate tax motivated artificial income shifting. The OECD 
acknowledges that while the purpose of treaties is to prevent double taxation, 
treaties sometimes “allow[] income from cross-border activities to go 
untaxed.”291 More specifically, MNEs utilize treaty discrepancies to create 
“double non-taxation, in particular through the use of conduit companies.”292 
Action 6 of the OECD BEPS Project directly addresses tax treaty abuse and 
the resultant BEPS issues associated with “treaty shopping.”293 Regardless, 
BEPS issues in general, and those selectively identified in Action 5’s 
transparency framework, consist of more than mere utilization of tax treaty 
discrepancies. As such, MAP may not possess expertise in general BEPS 
issues comparable to that of the FHTP. Therefore, the OECD should 
incorporate into MAP a distinct subdivision with expertise in BEPS matters 
comparable to that of the FHTP. 
While the FHTP and MAP apply the disgorgement mechanism’s 
substantive standards to issued rulings, the issuing country should be 
responsible for collecting the unwarranted tax concessions afforded by the 
ruling, as happens under current state aid law enforcement. But because the 
OECD BEPS Project is soft law, participating countries will need to enact 
domestic legislation to enforce FHPT and appellate decisions. Domestic 
legislation is the primary means by which participating countries commit 
themselves to the OECD BEPS Project.294 Domestic legislation mandating 
the collection of unwarranted tax concessions will ensure that the mechanism 
creates the desired behavioral changes. 
 
289 See id. 
290 These countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Id. at 10. 
291 OECD, BEPS FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 6, https://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPS-
FAQsEnglish.pdf [https://perma.cc/6E4L-DRDK]. 
292 Id. at 3. 
293 OECD, PREVENTING THE GRANTING OF TREATY BENEFITS IN INAPPROPRIATE 
CIRCUMSTANCES: ACTION 6 - 2015 FINAL REPORT 9 (2015). For more information on the OECD’s 
approach to combating MNE utilization of tax treaty discrepancies, see id. at 9-11. 
294 See DELOITTE, BEPS ACTION IMPLEMENTATION BY COUNTRY: BRAZIL 1 (2017), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-beps-actions-
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C. Reasons for the Adherence to the BEPS-Focused Disgorgement Mechanism 
Thus far, this Comment has argued that a disgorgement mechanism is 
necessary to achieve the desired effects of Action 5’s tax ruling transparency 
framework and has proffered a general structure this mechanism can take. 
However, this proposal is effective only to the extent that the relevant 
countries—those that issue violative tax rulings notwithstanding their 
agreement to comply with the OECD BEPS Project’s Actions—participate. 
Adherence to a BEPS-focused disgorgement mechanism would be a large 
commitment for those countries that issue violative rulings. Committing to 
the prospect of disgorgement is contrary to these countries’ incentives 
identified earlier,295 which is primarily to induce income shifting to extract a 
sliver of otherwise unobtainable tax revenue. Adherence to a BEPS-focused 
disgorgement mechanism would eliminate a tool these countries use to 
extract this tax revenue. From the perspective of these countries, adherence 
to a disgorgement mechanism appears to be directly at odds with their current 
incentives. Accordingly, adherence at first appears to be a rather lofty goal. 
However, if adherence can create net benefits that exceed the net benefits 
of issuing tax rulings that induce income shifting, then adherence is not only 
possible, but in these countries’ best interest. As mentioned, because the 
OECD BEPS Project is soft law, a country’s deviation from its terms does 
not impose any material adverse reputational impact to the country at 
issue.296 This does not necessarily mean that the converse is true. In fact, 
adherence to soft law agreements may actually create a material and beneficial 
reputational impact to that country. Compliance with international 
agreements generally enhances a country’s reputation for being collaborative 
and committing,297 and this reputational effect is in some cases a reason for 
entering into international agreements.298 Because adherence to a BEPS-
focused disgorgement mechanism would signal a strong commitment to 
stemming tax avoidance, the reputational benefits from such adherence would 
likely be large. Accordingly, to the extent the benefits of committing to a 
BEPS-focused disgorgement mechanism exceed the net benefits of 
continuing to issue violative tax rulings, committing is in those countries’ best 
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interest. Therefore, the BEPS-focused disgorgement mechanism may be able 
to garner widespread adherence. 
CONCLUSION 
The OECD BEPS Project is commendable because it addressed many 
facets of tax systems that give rise to BEPS issues. However, although the 
OECD BEPS Project provided comprehensive substantive measures for 
participating countries to implement, tax rulings, in theory, still remain an 
extremely viable mechanism to induce income shifting because they allow for 
selective deviations from any given country’s tax laws and OECD guidelines. 
Tax ruling transparency alone is an inadequate method to combat this 
abuse. The support for tax ruling transparency relies on the proposition that 
enhanced disclosure will disincentivize the use of rulings to selectively 
decrease MNE tax liability. This necessarily assumes that transparency will 
decrease rulings’ net benefits to either countries or recipient MNEs. 
However, transparency alone fails to do so. 
Therefore, introducing a BEPS-focused disgorgement mechanism is the 
best way to address the abuse of tax rulings. With disgorgement, there is a 
chance that the recipient MNE will have to remit the tax concession afforded 
through the ruling. Once coupled with Action 5’s transparency framework, 
there will be an increase in the number of instances in which using rulings to 
grant tax concessions is no longer viable. Once no longer viable, countries 
and MNEs can no longer use rulings to facilitate tax avoidance. 
Introducing a BEPS-focused disgorgement mechanism would be a 
significant feat. It would require a commitment from all participating 
countries and necessarily involve partial remittance of countries’ discretion 
of their power to tax. But the mechanism’s introduction is not too far removed 
from countries’ current commitment to the OECD BEPS Project. The 
mechanism would merely enforce the standards to which these countries 
already committed. And adherence to such a mechanism may provide 
significant reputational benefits that exceed the net benefits from using tax 
rulings to induce income shifting. Therefore, a BEPS-focused disgorgement 
mechanism may be attainable. 
